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NOTE 
Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying Prohibitions 
and Exemptions 
Song of the Open Road 
I think that I shall never see 
A billboard lovely as a tree. 
Indeed, unless the billboards fall, 
I'll never see a tree at all.1 
These four lines from humorist Ogden Nash reflect what is proba-
bly a widespread aesthetic judgment about billboards.2 The title is, of 
course, highly ironic: There is nothing "open" about a road so clut-
tered with billboards that country scenery is obscured. Actually, Nash 
put the matter gently. He did not say that billboards are ugly, only 
that they are out of place - at least where the aesthetic properties of 
natural objects would otherwise be enjoyed.3 In fact, the word 
"think" in line one leaves open the theoretical possibility (slim to be 
sure) of encountering a billboard which, due to its own beauty, would 
not arouse in the viewer a distinct preference to gaze at something else. 
But the posing of this possibility accentuates its remoteness. 
The final two lines convey a certain illogic. Unless joined together 
to create a barricade, billboards along an "open road" would not liter-
ally conceal every tree. But a multitude of billboards (or just one 
placed precisely) - due to their function as eye-catching devices -
can prevent a person from noticing a single tree though there may be 
many within view.4 
When the aesthetic concern captured by "Song of the Open Road" 
becomes widespread, a law prohibiting billboards often results. Wide 
disagreement exists as to whether a city or state may, consistently with 
the first amendment, drastically reduce or even eliminate outdoor 
signs for aesthetic reasons. Isolating the issues dividing those who 
1. 0. NASH, I WOULDN'T HAVE MlssED IT: SELECTED POEMS OF OGDEN NASH 31 (1975) 
(quoted in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 886, 610 P.2d 407, 429, 164 
Cal. Rptr. 510, 532 (1980)). The poem is a tongue-in-cheek allusion to Joyce Kilmer's "Trees," 
which begins "I think that I shall never see/ A poem as lovely as a tree." 1 J. KILMER, POEMS, 
EssAYS AND LETTERS IN Two VOLUMES 180 (1918). 
2. This Note uses the term "billboard" not in its customary and generic sense as a synonym 
for a permanent outdoor sign, but in its technical sense, meaning "offsite sign." This technical 
use of the term is in keeping with the court opinions cited in this Note. See infra note 9 for this 
Note's definition of "offsite sign." 
3. See Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 
MICH. L. REv. 355 (1982), for an argument that a perception of beauty or ugliness is merely a 
perception of something being either in or out of place. 
4. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. 
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generally would defer to local aesthetic interests from those who gen-
erally would not, this Note traces the difficulties the courts have had in 
locating and justifying a standard for deciding these cases. The Note 
argues for a standard sympathetic with local desires to ban billboards. 
According to this standard, only signs that identify the premises on 
which they are located may not be prohibited. 5 While this standard 
has occasionally been advocated, it has never been fully defended. 6 
That defense is ultimately the task of this Note. 
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 7 the Supreme Court wres-
tled with the first amendment questions raised by sign prohibitions for 
the first time, but left many of them unresolved. The Court produced 
five separate opinions and no majority. Then-Justice Rehnquist re-
ferred to the Court's effort as a "virtual Tower of Babel, from which 
no definitive principles can be clearly drawn."8 
In Metromedia the Court struck down a San Diego ordinance that 
prohibited all offsite signs9 but permitted onsite signs10 for commercial 
purposes.11 However, the ordinance also exempted signs within 
5. This standard would also permit a state or city to protect additional signs if this protection 
has a reasonable relation to the aesthetic objectives of the sign regulation and does not indicate 
an intent to control public debate by prohibiting or exempting controversial subject matter. See 
infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. 
6. Stephen Williams has pointed out that ordinances that "protect a class of signs that relate 
.•• closely to their locations" cannot be considered "antiexpression" measures, for they merely 
acknowledge the unique relation between sign and land in such cases. Williams, Subjectivity, 
Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. l, 43 (1977). Simi-
larly, John Lucking has argued that signs that identify the products and services available where 
the sign is located deserve favored status over other signs. Lucking, The Regulation of Outdoor 
Advertising: Past, Present, and Future, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 179, 193 (1977). However, both Williams 
and Lucking wrote four years prior to the Supreme Court decision now controlling billboard 
disputes, whose plurality held that a court must inquire whether an affected sign is co=ercial 
or nonco=ercial, not identifying or nonidentifying. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
U.S. 490 (1981). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
7. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
8. 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
9. For purposes of this Note, an offsite sign is a sign, either co=ercial or nonco=ercial, 
which advertises activities not conducted, services not provided, or products not dispensed or 
sold on the premises where the sign is located. This definition is in keeping with the court opin-
ions cited in this Note. Moreover, a billboard is an offsite sign. See supra note 2. 
10. The term "onsite sign" refers to signs, co=ercial or nonco=ercial, that refer to or 
identify activities conducted, services provided, or products sold or dispensed on the premises 
where the sign is located. This definition of "onsite sign" is consistent with court opinions cited 
in this Note that employ the onsite/offsite distinction. 
11. The ordinance stated: 
Only those outdoor advertising display signs .•• which are either signs designating the name 
of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying 
such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on 
the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted. 
453 U.S. at 493 n.1. Justice Brennan disputed the plurality's contention that this provision did 
not apply equally to co=ercial and nonco=ercial signs. 453 U.S. at 535 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). 
The ordinance exempts identifying signs generally in addition to "onsite signs." None of the 
Metromedia opinions makes anything of this fact, nor observes that an onsite sign is merely one 
type of identifying sign. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. See also Part IV for argu-
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twelve specific categories, both commercial and noncommercial. Jus-
tice White, writing for the plurality, found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional for two reasons. First, in exempting commercial onsite signs 
but not noncommercial onsite signs, the ordinance favored commer-
cial over noncommercial speech. Second, the ordinance favored cer-
tain noncommercial signs over other noncommercial signs. White 
thus indicated two defects either of which would invalidate an 
ordinance. 
Ambiguities within the plurality opinion have spawned two con-
tradictory interpretations of Metromedia. One view permits the prohi-
bition of commercial signs but protects all noncommercial signs (the 
"commercial/noncommercial distinction"). The other view permits 
prohibition of noncommercial signs as long as the ordinance affords 
equal protection to commercial and noncommercial signs; this view 
allows governments to exempt all onsite signs while prohibiting all off-
site signs (the "onsite/offsite distinction"). 
These distinctions rely on divergent conceptions of "content-neu-
trality." The commercial/noncommercial distinction forbids restric-
tions on noncommercial signs that in any way depend on what a sign 
says or what function the sign serves. The onsite/offsite distinction 
requires only that the restriction not discriminate according to point of 
view or subject matter. For instance, the former distinction would not 
permit an exemption for any class of sign, even if potentially the class 
includes any point of view, because a sign's content must be assessed in 
order to determine its class. Conversely, the latter distinction would 
allow an exemption for a class of signs - onsite signs - as long as 
every sign within that class was exempt. 
The onsite/offsite distinction clearly gives greater leeway to local 
aesthetic interests than does the commercial/noncommercial distinc-
tion. The latter distinction removes aesthetic considerations from the 
equation: it protects each noncommercial sign regardless of whether it 
is more offensive or intrusive than a commercial sign. This Note ar-
gues that while the onsite/offsite distinction is superior to the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction, it fails to include other signs that 
should be protected under the rationale needed to protect onsite signs. 
Onsite signs should be protected because, as they identify the premises 
on which they are located, they cannot be replaced by an alternative 
means of communication.12 Therefore, all identifying signs - not just 
onsite signs - must be protected. Hence, the most appropriate dis-
tinction to employ in evaluating sign prohibitions is the "identifying/ 
nonidentifying distinction." 
Part I of this Note surveys the trends in the aesthetic regulation of 
ments as to why the identifying/nonidentifying distinction should be the critical distinction in 
determining what signs must be protected. 
12. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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billboards, culminating in the Supreme Court of California's decision 
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 13 and the Supreme Court's 
review of that decision. Part II analyzes the five Metromedia opinions 
in order to present properly the contemporary debate over billboard 
law. It inquires whether a sign prohibition should hinge on the com-
mercial or noncommercial status of the targeted signs. Part III indi-
cates how ambiguities in the Metromedia plurality opinion have 
produced the conflict in lower courts between the commercial/non-
commercial distinction and the onsite/ off site distinction, and examines 
some of the problems created by the application of these distinctions. 
Part IV argues that the Constitution should protect only those signs 
that cannot be replaced by alternative means of communication. It 
repudiates the commerciaVnoncommercial distinction for failing to 
protect signs according to this standard, and criticizes the onsite/ off-
site distinction for affording special protection to only one type of sign 
for which alternative means are lacking. Part IV then argues that the 
identifying/nonidentifying distinction would serve as an appropriate 
check on the wide discretion governments need to address the aes-
thetic problems posed by billboards. 
I. REGULATING AEsTHETICS BY BANNING BILLBOARDS 
During the early part of the twentieth century, local regulators in 
various states reacted to the sudden proliferation of billboards by pass-
ing laws restricting them.14 The courts invalidated most of these laws 
for being motivated solely by aesthetic concerns and therefore beyond 
the scope of the police power.15 Consequently, cities began to cite 
other reasons for prohibiting or restricting billboards, reasons safely 
within the traditional scope of the police power: protecting property 
values, protecting the tourist industry, or promoting traffic safety.16 
To uphold billboard laws, courts developed what has been called the 
"aesthetics-plus doctrine," which approved a billboard law if it merely 
furthered a customary police power goal in addition to addressing aes-
thetic concerns.17 - -
Courts have held aesthetic objectives suspect because they seem 
unavoidably subjective.18 Courts fear the ever-changing nature of aes-
thetic judgment, 19 and the fact that the majority, in pursuing aesthetic 
13. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980). , 
14. Dukeminier, Zoning far Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 218, 219 (1955). 
15. Id. 
16. Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and 
the Realities of Billboard Control, 9 EcoLOGY L.Q. 295, 295 (1981); see also Costonis, supra note 
3, at 374. 
17. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 303. 
18. Costonis, supra note 3, at 396-409; Dukeminier, supra note 14, at 225. 
19. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 662, 148 N.E. 
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objectives, could trample basic individual rights by imposing its arbi-
trary tastes on the minority.20 And Justice Brennan has recently ar-
gued that when the state justifies a restriction of individual rights on 
aesthetic grounds, the "inherent subjectivity" of the justification "im-
pairs the ability of a reviewing court" to conduct a meaningful 
review.21 
Despite its dangers, aesthetic policymaking cannot be entirely 
abandoned, for it undergirds ordinances such as zoning laws, for 
which political support will likely increase.22 However, the aesthetics-
plus doctrine fails to provide a dependable standard for policymaking, 
as it allows a court to validate aesthetically motivated legislation with-
out saying it is doing so.23 Courts have generally deferred to legisla-
tive decisions that billboards affect a legitimate police power concern, 
for it is difficult to prove that they do not.24 But, "it is unclear why 
aesthetics are a proper justification when in combination with another 
police-power objective and yet not when standing alone."25 If the sub-
jectivity of aesthetic judgments renders these judgments invalid foun-
dations for law, then legislation motivated by such judgments should 
be struck down regardless of the fact that a secondary justification has 
been offered as well. 
Following the current trend, the California Supreme Court, in 
1980, repudiated the aesthetics-plus doctrine as "unworkable" in Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 the case later reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.27 Writing for the court, Justice Tobriner argued that 
the aesthetics-plus doctrine was "discordant with modern thought as 
to the scope of the police power."28 He noted that economic and aes-
thetic considerations cannot be distinguished in a state that relies on 
aesthetic values to attract tourists.29 Moreover, Justice Tobriner ar-
842, 844 (1925) ("The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations were per-
mitted to govern the use of the police power."). 
20. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 
N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905) ("a man may [not] be deprived of his property because his 
tastes are not those of his neighbors"). 
21. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 822 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
22. Costonis, supra note 3, at 459. 
23. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 302; Dukeminier, supra note 14, at 220-23. 
24. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 859, 610 P.2d 407, 412, 
164 Cal. Rptr, 510, 515 (1980). A police-power justification puts the burden of proof on the 
law's opponent, who must prove there exists no rational connection between restricting bill-
boards and the stated police power goal - usually traffic safety. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 
306. 
25. Aronovsky, supra note 16, at 307. 
26. 26 Cal. 3d at 848, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (1980). 
27. 453 U.S. 490 (1981); see infra Part II. 
28. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516. 
29. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516. 
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gued that modem urban planning "would be virtually impossible" if 
aesthetic objectives were invalid. 30 A city could not pass basic zoning 
ordinances designed to improve appearances.31 And Tobriner ob-
served that most jurisdictions had accepted the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of a state's general right to regulate aesthetics in Berman v. 
Parker: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values 
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the Legislature to determine that the com-
munity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 32 
Berman raised no first amendment issues. It upheld a municipal 
plan to remove unsightly slum housing.33 But relying on a New York 
case validating a city-wide ban on billboards,34 Justice Tobriner ar-
gued that such an ordinance should be upheld unless its method for 
achieving aesthetic goals is arbitrary or irrational. 35 
When the Supreme Court reversed Tobriner's opinion, five justices 
nevertheless agreed that a city's aesthetic interest in removing visual 
clutter justified a ban on billboards. 36 Thus, no longer could a court 
strike down a billboard law simply by observing that aesthetic interests 
produced the law.37 However, four of those seven justices restricted 
the ban to commercial billboards. These four justices rejected the ra-
tional basis test proposed by Tobriner where noncommercial signs 
were affected. 38 That decision left only three justices who, following 
Tobriner, would have upheld a ban on all billboards, .commercial or 
noncommercial. The next Part begins the inquiry into whether com-
mercial and noncommercial signs should be distinguished, by analyz-
ing the Metromedia opinions. 
30. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
31. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
32. 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
33. Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
34. 26 Cal. 3d at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517 (citing Suffolk Outdoor Adv. 
Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977)). 
35. 26 Cal. 3d at 863, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
36. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981). 
37. The argument that the subjectivity of aesthetic judgments renders them insufficient to 
outweigh free speech claims has not vanished. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 823 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
38. In 1984 the Court validated a city ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public 
property, ruling that the city could protect its citizens from the "visual assault" created by the 
accumulation of such signs. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807. The ban included noncom-
mercial signs. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens explained why both commercial and non-
commercial signs could be banned under Taxpayers for Vincent even though only commercial 
billboards could be banned under Metromedia: in Metromedia "[t]he private citizen's interest in 
controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment." 466 U.S. at 811. 
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JI. THE METROMEDIA OPINIONS 
Metromedia settled very little in the law of billboards. Lower 
court decisions since Metromedia have been anything but uniform. 
On the one hand, ordinances less intrusive to first amendment con-
cerns than the Metromedia ordinance have been found unconstitu-
tional;39 but on the other hand, courts have merely applied a rational 
basis test in validating ordinances that arguably present greater facial 
challenges to the first amendment than did the Metromedia ordi-
nance.40 The two lines of cases that have emerged since Metromedia, 
and that now comprise the central debate over billboard law, have rec-
ognizable roots in the Metromedia opinions.41 Therefore, these opin-
ions must be analyzed in order to understand the contemporary 
debate. 
The Metromedia Court considered a San Diego ordinance that 
prohibited all offsite signs but permitted commercial onsite signs. The 
ordinance also permitted signs within twelve specific categories such 
as governmental signs, bench signs at public bus stops, commemora-
tive historical plaques, religious symbols, for sale and for lease signs, 
signs on public and commercial vehicles, signs displaying the time, 
temperature, or news, and temporary political campaign signs. 42 The 
Metromedia plurality protected noncommercial signs but not commer-
cial signs, the concurring justices would have protected both commer-
cial and noncommercial signs, and the three dissenting justices would 
have protected neither. 
A. The Plurality Opinion 
Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated that a city may pro-
hibit offsite commercial signs while permitting onsite commercial 
signs. Applying the test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission 43 for determining the validity of 
commercial speech restrictions, Justice White observed that there 
could be little doubt that the San Diego ordinance passed three of the 
four criteria: that is, the regulated activity was neither unlawful nor 
misleading; the city had a substantial interest in both safety and aes-
thetics; and the city had gone no further than necessary in trying to 
meet its safety and aesthetic goals because it had not prohibited all 
39. See Jackson v. City Council of Charlottesville, 659 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982). These two cases are 
discussed in Part III infra. 
40. See, e.g., Department ofTransp. v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873, 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984), 
41. See section III.A. 
42. 453 U.S. 490, 494-96 (1981) (citing San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series) (Mar. 
14, 1972)). 
43. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Central Hudson's four-part test indicates that government 
may regulate commercial speech with wider discretion than it may regulate noncommercial 
speech. 447 U.S. at 562-63. 
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outdoor signs.44 As to the fourth criterion - whether the ordinance 
directly advances the governmental interests - White argued: 
[T]he city could reasonably conclude that a commercial enterprise - as 
well as the interested public - has a stronger interest in identifying its 
place of business and advertising the products or services available there 
than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of adver-
tising commercial enterprises located elsewhere.45 
However, the plurality found the ordinance unconstitutional for 
two reasons. First, by exempting onsite commercial signs from the 
general prohibition, the ordinance favored commercial speech over 
noncommercial speech, thereby inverting the Court's presumption 
that the first amendment affords greater protection to noncommercial 
speech.46 Noting the purposes of the ordinance - to promote safety 
by eliminating signs that distract motorists and pedestrians and to pre-
serve and improve the city's appearance-Justice White pointed out 
that the city had not explained how a noncommercial sign would be 
any more threatening to safety or detrimental to aesthetic concerns 
than would a commercial sign. 47 
Second, the ordinance protected certain kinds of noncommercial 
speech - those that fell within its twelve exemptions - but not other 
kinds.48 Justice White contended that while a city may treat different 
categories of commercial speech differently (as long as there is a ra-
tional basis for doing so and no impermissible regulatory motive), it 
may not distinguish among categories of noncommercial speech.49 A 
city "may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse"50 
and thereby "control ... the search for political truth."51 
To explain further why the San Diego ordinance was unconstitu-
tional, White argued that the ordinance did not meet the test for 
"time, place, and manner" restrictions. 52 A time, place, or manner 
restriction must (1) be justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, (2) be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial gov-
ernment interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative means for com-
municating the restricted information. 53 Because such restrictions fall 
44. 453 U.S. at 507. 
45. 453 U.S. at 512. 
46. 453 U.S. at 513. 
47. 453 U.S. at 513; see also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
48. For instance, religious symbols and historical plaques would be permitted, but a sign 
bearing the message "Abortion is Murder'' would not be. 
49. 453 U.S. at 514; see also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 15 (1980). 
50. 453 U.S. at 515. 
51. 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 530, 
538 (1980)). 
52. 453 U.S. at 515-16. 
53. 453 U.S. at 516 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer_ Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this standard in Clark v. 
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short of prohibitions and do not restrict according to content, they 
generally receive a deferential level of judicial scrutiny.s4 
According to Justice White, the San Diego ordinance failed re-
quirements one and two for time, place, and manner restrictions. He 
argued that the ordinance was obviously not content-neutral because it 
distinguished signs as permissible or impermissible at given locations 
depending upon the sign message. ss He also argued that ample alter-
native means were not available to the users of San Diego billboards 
based on the fact that the parties had stipulated that advertisers use 
billboards because other forms of advertising are "insufficient, inap-
propriate and prohibitively expensive."s6 Despite these two failed re-
quirements, Justice White upheld the ordinance's restrictions on 
commercial speech. Thus, according to White, billboard laws may 
discriminate against commercial signs regardless of whether adequate 
alternative means of communication exist. s7 
The standard for time, place, and manner restrictions has become 
the test by which many billboard laws stand or fall. This has occurred 
primarily because the San Diego ordinance's primary defects - favor-
ing commercial speech over noncommercial speech and favoring some 
kinds of noncommercial speech over others - are easily corrected, at 
least facially. That is, these defects are apparently cured by an ordi-
nance that simply permits noncommercial as well as commercial on-
site signs. A number of cases involve laws framed in this way.ss A 
court asked to rule on an ordinance apparently without the primary 
Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), Members of the City Council 
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984), and in Heffron v. International Socy. for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 4S2 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). 
S4. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, S4 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, S2 (1987). Indeed, the 
label "time, place, or manner restriction" indicates a legal conclusion by a court that the restric-
tion is valid. Id. at S2 n.23. 
SS. 4S3 U.S. at Sl6. 
S6. 4S3 U.S. at Sl6 (quoting Joint Stipulation of Facts). White also relied on Linmark As-
socs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 8S (1977), which struck down a prohibition of 
"for sale" signs on private residential property. Linmark deemed alternatives to "for sale" signs 
"far from satisfactory" because they involved "more cost and less autonomy." 4S3 U.S. at S16 
(quoting Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93). Chief Justice Burger took issue with White, claiming that 
just because billboards may cost less than other media does not mean that adequate alternative 
means of communication do not exist. See infra notes 8S-89 and accompanying text. This Note 
expands upon Burger's position. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. 
S7. A number of subsequent decisions assume that an ordinance is valid by Metromedia stan-
dards if it does not facially discriminate against noncommercial speech nor favor any type of 
noncommercial speech. Such decisions do not apply White's standard regarding the lack of al-
ternative means of communication. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 
S86 (6th Cir. 1987); Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 84S F.2d 6S3 (6th Cir. 1988); see 
also infra notes 138-S9, 180-8S and accompanying text. 
S8. See e.g., Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 84S F.2d 6S3 (6th Cir. 1988); Wheeler v. 
Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d S86 (6th Cir. 1987); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. 
City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. City Council of Charlottesville, 6S9 
F.Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, S38 F. Supp. 1183 (D. 
Md. 1982). 
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defects of the San Diego ordinance will necessarily decide the case 
based on whether the ordinance is content-neutral regarding noncom-
mercial speech and whether ample alternative means of communica-
tion exist. Thus, the court will utilize two prongs of the standard for 
time, place, and manner restrictions. However, wide disagreement ex-
ists as to what these prongs mean and when they should apply. 
Justice Brennan's concurrence rejected the plurality's refusal to 
protect commercial billboards, especially because noncommercial bill-
boards would disappear also. Conversely, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Stevens objected to the plurality's interpretations of content-
neutrality and adequate alternative means, believing them unduly bur-
densome to local governments. Then-Justice Rehnquist, agreeing sub-
stantially with Justices Stevens and Burger, wrote separately to 
emphasize a city's right to use its discretion in regulating aesthetics 
and to attack specifically Brennan's desire to restrict this discretion. 
These opinions have influenced the current debate over billboard laws. 
B. The Brennan Concurrence 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the 
finding of unconstitutionality but disagreed with the plurality in two 
fundamental ways. First, Brennan viewed the ordinance as a total ban 
of billboards, the exemptions notwithstanding. He claimed that the 
practical effect of the ordinance was "to eliminate the billboard as an 
effective medium of communication."59 Consequently, Brennan 
would have struck down the ordinance because it failed a stricter stan-
dard of review, not because it granted invalid exceptions from a gen-
eral ban. A city would have to show "that a sufficiently substantial 
governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban, and that 
any more narrowly drawn restriction, i.e., anything less than a total 
ban, would promote less well the achievement of that goal."60 Bren-
nan would have invalidated the ordinance because San Diego did not 
prove "that billboards actually impair traffic safety."61 Moreover, 
Brennan argued that San Diego did not show that its aesthetic interest 
was "sufficiently substantial in the commercial and industrial areas" of 
the city.62 In Brennan's view, a city must show that billboards are 
"necessarily inconsistent" with the area in which they would be 
banned. 63 Prohibiting billboards would be unconstitutional except 
where it is part of a comprehensive effort to improve given areas of the 
city.64 
59. 453 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
60. 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
61. 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
62. 453 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
63. 453 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
64. 453 U.S. at 531-32 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan observed that a community such 
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Second, Brennan rejected the plurality's separate treatment of 
commercial and noncommercial speech. He argued that Central Hud-
son demands stronger protection for commercial speech than the ra-
tional basis test applied by the plurality. 65 Brennan pointed out that, 
under a ban on commercial billboards, a goveniment official must 
sometimes determine whether a billboard is commercial or noncom-
mercial, a difficult task for which no bright lines are available. Giving 
an official such discretion "presents a real danger of curtailing non-
commercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial speech. " 66 
Brennan argued further that commercial advertisers would be able to 
convey commercial messages free from regulation simply by dressing 
them up with ideology. 67 
Justice Brennan viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on 
a communication medium because he viewed the offsite sign as a me-
dium distinct from the onsite sign: "Unlike the on-premises sign, the 
off-premises billboard 'is, generally speaking, made available to 'all-
comers,' in a fashion similar to newspaper or broadcasting advertis-
ing.' " 68 If the offsite sign and the onsite sign are considered media 
distinct from one another, then an ordinance eliminating offsite signs 
could not be viewed as a time, place, or manner restriction. According 
to Brennan, even an ordinance banning only offsite commercial signs 
would be suspect because offsite noncommercial advertisers could not 
sustain the billboard businesses. 69 The practical effect of such an ordi-
nance would be to ban off site signs. 70 
C. The Stevens Dissent 
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Brennan that the San Diego 
ordinance presented the issue of whether a total ban of billboards 
would be valid. 71 Like Brennan, Stevens viewed onsite signs and bill-
boards as two different media.72 However, Stevens noted that while 
the ordinance would eliminate the billboard industry in San Diego (as 
well as the public's opportunity to advertise via billboards), there was 
as Williamsburg, Virginia, which cultivates a historic "look," could easily prove an aesthetic 
interest in removing billboards. Similarly, billboards are clearly inconsistent with the environ· 
ment of a national park. 453 U.S. at 533-34. 
65. 453 U.S. at 534 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
66. 453 U.S. at 536-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
67. 453 U.S. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
68. 453 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Joint Stipulation of Facts). 
69. See 453 U.S. at 536 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring); 453 U.S. at 541 n.4 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part); see also infra Section III.C. 
70. 453 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan's willingness to look at the results of 
billboard laws anticipated a lower court decision that struck down an ordinance for a lack of 
content-neutrality due to its practical effects, not its facial construction. See notes 189-99 and 
accompanying text. 
71. 453 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
72. 453 U.S. at 542-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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no evidence to suggest that the ordinance would hav:e any effect on a 
property owner's use of onsite signs. 73 Stevens argued, therefore, that 
the Court should have ruled on the billboard ban but denied standing 
to the appellant billboard leasing companies to raise the "hypothetical 
claims of onsite advertisers."74 Herice, Stevens did not reach the issue 
of whether or not the San Diego ordinance favored commercial speech 
over noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, his understanding of fifst 
amendment neutrality, as expressed in his Metromedia opinion, has 
had a considerable impact on this debate. 
Stevens agreed with the plurality that a city has a legitimate inter-
est in regulating billboards for aesthetic purposes. 75 But Stevens 
would have applied a different, two-pronged test: 
First, is there any reason to believe that the regulation is biased in favor 
of one point of view or another, or that it is a subtle method of regulating 
the controversial subjects that may be placed on the agenda for public 
debate? Second, is it fair to conclude that the market which remains 
open for the communication of both popular and unpopular ideas is am-
ple and not threatened with gradually increasing restraints?76 
The Stevens test differs from the plurality's test in that (1) it asks 
whether the ordinance restricts viewpoint, not content, and (2) in as-
sessing the adequacy of alternative means, it seems to focus primarily 
on the health of the communications market as a whole and not on the 
specific attributes of billboard advertising as compared with the attrib-
utes of other advertising media. Unlike Justice White, Stevens consid-
ered the relative cost of billboard advertising immaterial. Stevens 
concluded that the ordinance should be upheld because there was no 
hint of .city bias or censorship, 77 nor a basis for finding that San Di-
ego's communications market could not provide adequate alternatives 
for messages formerly on billboards. 78 
For Stevens, first amendment neutrality means that government 
does not "impose its viewpoint on the public or select the topics on 
which public debate is permissible."79 His use of the words "view-
73. 453 U.S. at 543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
74. 453 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
75. Taking issue with Brennan, Stevens argued that just as a city may ban billboards from 
residential areas, so it may ban them from industrial or commercial areas. 
[T]he interests served by the ban are equally legitimate and substantial in all parts of the 
city .•.. The character of the environment affects property values and the quality of life not 
only for the suburban resident but equally so for the individual who toils in a factory or 
invests his capital in industrial properties. 
453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
76. 453 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
77. The billboard companies did not allege that San Diego was trying to suppress speech. 
See 453 U.S. at 566 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nor did any justice in Metromedia allege this 
motive. 
78. 453 U.S. at 552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
79. 453 U.S. at 553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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point" and "topics" - as opposed to "content" - suggests an inquiry 
more concerned with determining governmental motive than with de-
termining the category of speech to which the regulated speech be-
longs. In fact, the plurality's commercial/noncommercial distinction 
becomes irrelevant under the Stevens test, as does reliance on the word 
"content." 
Indeed, "content" may refer to viewpoint, categories of speech, or 
subject matter. For the plurality, an ordinance which restricts any of 
these three areas would not be "content-neutral." In objecting to the 
San Diego exemption for onsite commercial speech, the plurality ob-
jected to the favoring of one category of speech over another. How-
ever, the plurality objected to the noncommercial speech exemptions 
because a city may not determine the permissible subject matter for 
public debate. Under Stevens' test, neither type of exemption threat-
ens first amendment values because while each may restrict "content," 
neither restricts "viewpoint. " 80 
Regarding the noncommercial exemptions, Stevens pointed out 
that only four of the twelve pertain to subject matter: signs displaying 
the time, temperature or news; historical plaques; religious symbols; 
and temporary political campaign signs. Stevens argued that none of 
these exemptions suggested that the city was choosing permissible top-
ics for public discourse. For instance, all religious symbols were per-
mitted. Moreover, according to Stevens, the city could reasonably 
have determined that these exempted signs were either typically 
smaller and hence less damaging to the appearance of the city than the 
typical billboard (time or temperature signs, religious symbols, histori-
cal plaques) or more central to the core first amendment value of en-
hancing self-government (temporary political campaign signs).81 
With his broad interpretations of content-neutrality and adequate 
alternative means, Stevens questioned why the San Diego ordinance 
should be invalidated because of what it exempted, when by virtue of 
these exemptions it would have had "a less serious effect on the com-
munications market than would a total ban."82 Thus, Stevens chided 
the plurality for invalidating an ordinance not because it abridged 
speech, but "because it [did] not abridge enough speech."83 
80. Early in his opinion, Stevens used the phrase "content-neutral exceptions" to refer to the 
two types of exemptions provided by the ordinance. 453 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part). His use ofthis phrase suggests that although the exemptions were based at least in part on 
content in a certain sense, in Stevens' view they were not "content-based" in a constitutional 
sense because they were not based on viewpoint. 
81. 453 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
82. 453 U.S. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
83. 453 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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D. The Burger Dissent 
Chief Justice Burger would have applied a test virtually identical 
to that proposed by Justice Stevens. Given its legitimate interests in 
aesthetics and traffic safety, a city may restrict billboards if the restric-
tion (1) is neutral with respect to viewpoint and topics for public de-
bate, and (2) leaves open alternative means of communication. 84 For 
Burger, the question of adequate alternatives hinged on whether 
messages carried by billboards "can reach an equally large audience" 
through other media. 85 He concluded that they could, partly because 
messages carried by billboards "are not inseparable from the bill-
boards that carry them," i.e., the messages on billboards may be con-
veyed in other ways. 86 While billboards may catch one's eye more 
readily and may cost less than other media, such factors do not prove 
that adequate alternatives do not exist. 87 Rather, those who oppose 
the restriction must show that messages conveyed by billboards are 
"relatively disadvantaged" compared to the messages presented by 
other means. 88 Burger pointed out that the appellants in Metromedia 
did not even suggest that billboards promote certain viewpoints or is-
sues disproportionately to other media. 89 
Burger's discussion of the neutrality criterion was the primary 
thrust of his opinion. He attacked the plurality's argument that the 
exemptions in the San Diego ordinance violated first amendment neu-
trality. Because there was no hint of an attempt by the city to sup-
press viewpoints or to favo+ one side of a public debate, Burger viewed 
the exemptions as rational legislative choices "to permit a narrow class 
of signs that serve special needs. "90 He argued that "in each instance, 
the city reasonably could conclude that the balance between safety and 
aesthetic concerns on the one hand and the need to communicate on 
the other has tipped the opposite way."91 
84. 4S3 U.S. at S6Q.63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger would apply the same test regard-
less of whether the regulation is characterized as a time, place, or manner restriction or a total 
ban with some exceptions depending in part on content. 4S3 U.S. at SS1 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
8S. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
86. 4S3 U.S. S62·63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
87. Given the variety of media available - "newspapers, television, radio, magazines, direct 
mail, pamphlets, etc." - Burger presumes that the party opposed to the restriction has the 
burden of proving the inadequacy of these alternatives. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
88. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Billboards are not like pamphlets, whose char-
acteristics make them particularly suitable for disseminating unpopular or less influential views. 
See Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Coun: The Doctrine of Time, Place 
and Manner Regulations of Expression, S4 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 7S7 (1986); see also Ackerley 
Communications, Inc. v. Somerville, 692 F. Supp. 1, 21 (D. Mass. 1988), revd. on other grounds, 
878 F.2d Sl3 (1st Cir. 1989). 
89. 4S3 U.S. at S63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
90. 4S3 U.S. at SSS (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
91. 4S3 U.S. at S6S (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This is the type of balancing that Brennan 
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Burger indicated that exemptions for certain signs have justifica-
tion apart from the general right of governments to exercise their po-
lice-power: "For each exception, the city is either acknowledging the 
unique connection between the medium and the message conveyed ... 
or promoting a legitimate public interest in information."92 Burger 
cited the argument in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro that a "for sale" sign derives its meaning and efficacy from the 
site on which it is located.93 Burger's reasoning can also be applied to 
historical plaques, which give a particular designation to a given site, 
and to onsite signs, which identify a premises or advertise products or 
services available on a premises. An exception for such signs would be 
justified because such signs are arguably the only means of conveying a 
given message. For example, a sign identifying a given site cannot be 
replaced by a television advertisement telling the viewer how to get to 
the site. An identifying sign tells one that one has arrived at a given 
site, not how to get there.94 Therefore, the exemption for onsite signs 
rests on a difference in kind between billboards and onsite signs. 95 
By contrast, exempted signs that merely promote a legitimate pub-
lic interest in information cannot be distinguished from billboards in a 
material way. These signs do not convey messages that cannot be con-
veyed by other media. Moreover, presumably the public would have 
an equal interest in the information provided by signs in this category 
would leave to the courts, 453 U.S. at 538 (Brennan, J., concurring), and White would permit 
only where the regulator is choosing between types of commercial speech. 453 U.S. at 514 (plu-
rality opinion). Burger's emphasis on "special needs" differs from Stevens' rationale for most of 
the nonco=ercial exemptions based on subject matter. Stevens asserted that a city could rea· 
sonably conclude that signs such as religious symbols, historical plaques, and time, temperature, 
or news signs were usually smaller than a billboard and therefore were usually less damaging to 
the environment and less distracting to motorists. 453 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part). Hence, Stevens justified these three noncommercial exemptions in terms of the stated 
purposes of the ordinance. 
92. 453 U.S. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
93. 453 U.S. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil· 
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)). 
94. Lucking, supra note 6, at 194. Any additional information on an identifying sign that 
advertises goods and services available on the site, of course, could be replaced more easily by a 
television advertisement. But it may be difficult to prove that such additional information creates 
an aesthetic or safety concern greater than that posed by the sign itself. See H & H Operations, 
Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981). Moreover, an ordinance that 
allowed advertising of names but not of products and services would be disproportionately bur· 
densome to smaller and less well-known establishments whose names do not conjure up in the 
minds of prospective.' consumers the products and services provided by these establishments. See 
John Donnelly & i::)ns v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J., concurring). 
However, under the: analysis of either Stevens or Burger, a city or state could conceivably offer 
reasonable justifications for allowing information that identifies a premises while prohibiting in· 
formation that advertises goods and services. 
95. Both Brennan and Stevens seem to support the view that onsite and offsite signs are two 
different media. See 453 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., concurring); 453 U.S. at 542-44 (Stevens, J,, 
dissenting in part). However, they do not emphasize that the identifying nature of onsite signs 
makes them impossible to replace by alternative means. 
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and by billboards.96 Therefore, Burger's defense of the noncommer-
cial exemptions provided by the San Diego ordinance must ultimately 
rest on the discretionary right of the city. Indeed, Burger did not ar-
gue that the exempted signs were inherently more valuable than bill-
boards. Rather, his characterization of the exempted signs - that 
they pertain merely to factual information and to subject matter about 
which there can be no rational debate97 - was designed to show that 
there could be no threat to the first amendment in permitting the city 
to exempt such signs.9s 
Without discretionary exemption power, according to Burger, a 
city cannot effectively combat the problems presented by billboards. 
Burger claimed that the plurality, in denying the constitutionality of 
narrowly defined exceptions, left the city with a choice between two 
equally unsatisfactory alternatives: (1) banning all signs, or 
(2) prohibiting certain commercial signs but permitting all noncom-
mercial signs, no matter what their effect on the environment.99 
Moreover, Burger noted that the plurality seemed to indicate that it 
would invalidate a complete ban of billboards.100 Hence, a city actu-
ally would have only the one choice of permitting all noncommercial 
signs.101 For Burger, to leave a city with such limited options is to be 
"insensitiv[e] to the impact of ... billboards on those who must live 
with them and the delicacy of the legislative judgments involved in 
regulating them."102 
Burger attacked the plurality's application of the principle that 
noncommercial speech reeeives greater constitutional protection than 
does commercial speech. Unlike the plurality, Burger distinguished 
statutory protection from constitutional protection. Once an ordi-
nance passes the more rigid constitutional test for restricting noncom-
96. Indeed, under various theories bf the first amendment, there is arguably a public interest 
in all information. The larger the pool of information, the greater chance there is that true or 
useful information has not been suppressed. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (asserting society's strong interest in "the free 
flow of commercial information"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market"). 
97. 453 U.S. at 564-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
98. Of course, one can argue that the threat to the first amendment is not in permitting such 
signs but in prohibiting others. 
99. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
100. 453 U.S. at 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
101. Subsequent cases seem to indicate that this choice would not be ineffective. Though a 
city may have to permit all noncommercial signs, such permission is not necessarily protection, 
for noncommercial messages cannot support the billboard industry. See infra note 194 and ac-
companying text and supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Still, while most noncommercial 
billboards would be eliminated simply by the elimination of commercial billboards, where non-
commercial billboards are protected per se, individual cases involving particularly intrusive non-
commercial billboards could not be addressed by the state. See infra note 213 and accompanying 
text. 
102. 453 U.S. at 556 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
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mercial speech, the regulating body may reasonably decide to provide 
greater statutory protection to certain commercial speech. 103 This de-
cision would not necessarily mean that a city had placed a greater 
value on commercial speech generally.104 Indeed, a city could have 
independent grounds for granting an exemption for commercial 
speech. Moreover, Burger turned to his own advantage the plurality's 
argument that while a city may distinguish between various types of 
commercial speech, it may not do so with respect to noncommercial 
speech.105 "[W]hen adequate alternative channels of communication 
are readily available ... a city arguably is more faithful to the Consti-
tution by treating all noncommercial speech the same than by attempt-
ing to impose the same classifications in noncommercial as it has in 
commercial areas."106 Burger went on to anticipate a first amendment 
challenge raised in subsequent cases: namely, that to extend the onsite 
exemption to noncommercial signs would be to favor the views of 
those who own noncommercial property in commercial districts.101 
Burger concluded that "a city should be commended, not condemned, 
for treating all noncommercial speech the same."1os 
Burger's argument assumes that the San Diego ordinance passes 
constitutional muster regarding noncommercial speech. But the plu-
rality did not reach the issue of whether a total ban of outdoor adver-
tising signs is constitutional.109 However, the plurality opinion does 
suggest that (absent the noncommercial exemptions) the ordinance 
might have been valid had it extended the onsite exemption to non-
commercial signs: "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it 
cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages .... " 110 
Burger pointed out that by the plurality's own assertion - that a city 
may not balance noncommercial communicative interests within the 
same communications medium - onsite noncommercial signs may 
not be favored over offsite noncommercial signs.111 
103. 453 U.S. at 567 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
104. 453 U.S. at 568 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
105. 453 U.S. at 568-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing 453 U.S. at 514). 
106. 453 U.S. at 568 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
107. 453 U.S. at 568 n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see infra notes 195, 208 and accom-
panying text. 
108. 453 U.S. at 569 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger does not explain how the San Diego 
ordinance can be said to treat all noncommercial speech the same when it grants exemptions to 
certain types of noncommercial signs. 
109. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. 
110. 453 U.S. at 513. Subsequent cases have interpreted Metromedia to mean that an ordi-
nance would be valid if the onsite exemption were extended to noncommercial signs. See e.g., 
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987); Major Media of the South· 
east, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Bal ti· 
more, 538 F.Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982); see also infra notes 138-59, 180-85, 187-96 and 
accompanying text. 
111. Arguably, one does not favor one type of noncommercial speech over another when one 
exempts onsite signs because theoretically an onsite sign could convey an infinite number of 
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E. The Rehnquist Dissent 
Justice Rehnquist agreed "substantially'' with the Stevens and 
Burger dissents but wrote separately to stress that in his view a city's 
aesthetic interest alone is strong enough to justify a ban on billboards, 
and that none of the exemptions granted by San Diego rendered the 
ordinance invalid.112 In response to Justice Brennan, he argued that 
all communities, whether already beautified (Williamsburg) or still un-
sightly (older parts of major cities) "should not be prevented from rak-
ing steps to correct, as best they may, mistalces of their 
predecessors."113 Additionally, Rehnquist asserted that no real alter-
native exists to granting a local government the freedom to enforce 
aesthetic judgments: 
Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to believe that a judge. 
is in any better position than a city or county commission to make deci-
sions in an area such as aesthetics. Therefore, little can be gained in the 
area of constitutional law, and much lost in the process of democratic 
decisionmaking, by allowing individual judges in city after city to sec-
ond-guess such legislative or administrative determinations.114 
Brennan's position was that neither judge nor local government may 
enforce aesthetic judgments except where the government has demon-
strated a comprehensive plan to improve appearances. 115 But Rehn-
quist's response implies that Brennan's position is an aesthetic 
judgment imposed upon local government: the judgment that in the 
case of billboards local aesthetic interests fail to outweigh first amend-
ment values except in atypical communities. 
F. Summary of Metromedia 
To summarize Metromedia: First, the plurality held that commer-
cial signs could be prohibited and that onsite commercial signs could 
be exempted from this prohibition. Second, as to whether noncom-
messages depending on the occupant of the land on which the sign is placed. See infra notes 144-
45 and accompanying text. Additionally, an ordinance that permits onsite noncommercial signs 
but not olfsite noncommercial signs could be justified, despite the plurality's rule against balanc-
ing noncommercial speech interests within a given medium, by viewing onsite signs as compris-
ing a distinct medium from olfsite signs. This is something the plurality was unwilling to do. 
But see supra notes 68 and 72 and accompanying texts for arguments by Justice Brennan and 
Justice Stevens to the contrary. 
Moreover, an ordinance that balances different noncommercial communicative interests 
might also be justified under the theory espoused by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens: 
namely, that noncommercial speech may be excepted if the exception does not favor one side of a 
public debate. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
112. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
113. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, Brennan's emphasis on whether 
billboards are "inconsistent" with a particular environment ignores the source of aesthetic moti-
vation, which is a vision of what something ought to look like, not a mere acceptance of the way 
it presently appears. 
114. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
115. 453 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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mercial signs could be prohibited along with commercial signs, the 
three dissenting justices said yes, the two concurring justices said no, 
and the four plurality justices took no position. However, six justices 
- four in the plurality and two concurring - held that noncommer-
cial signs could not be prohibited when an exception was made either 
for certain kinds of noncommercial signs or for onsite commercial 
signs. Hence, a city may neither weigh the merits of different noncom-
mercial communicative interests nor grant statutory "preference" to 
commercial signs over noncommercial signs. 
III. THE AFrnRMATH OF METROMEDIA 
A. The Ambiguity of Metromedia: Two Views of 
Content-Neutrality 
The primary question facing the lower courts after Metromedia is 
whether an ordinance is constitutional if it neither prefers one type of 
noncommercial sign over any other type of noncommercial sign nor 
reserves an onsite sign exemption only for commercial signs. Courts 
have decided both ways. One side argues that such an ordinance is 
constitutional because it lacks the defects of the San Diego ordinance. 
The other side counters that despite improvements over the San Diego 
ordinance, such an ordinance would still favor commercial over non-
commercial speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore 116 and 
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways 111 represent the two sides of 
this debate. An analysis of these two opinions will demonstrate that 
their divergence stems from an ambiguity in the plurality opinion of 
Metromedia. 
1. The Baltimore Ordinance 
The ordinance in Baltimore extended an onsite exemption to both 
commercial and noncommercial signs: "No signs other than those 
identifying the property where they are installed or identifying the use 
conducted therein shall be permitted. Advertising by material or 
product manufacturers shall not be permitted except as primary iden-
tification of an establishment."118 The district court acknowledged 
that the ordinance was content-neutral in the sense that noncommer-
cial owners or occupants could "identify their premises to the same 
extent" as could commercial parties.119 But the court determined 
that the ordinance discriminated against noncommercial speech gener-
ally because while an owner could use a sign to identify his premises, 
116. 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Md. 1982). The plaintiff here is the same billboard company 
which brought suit against San Diego in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. 
117. 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987). 
118. 538 F. Supp. at 1185. 
119. 538 F. Supp. at 1187. 
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he could not affix a sign to his premises in order to display "his ideas 
or those of others."120 The court concluded that the Baltimore ordi-
nance was "facially invalid'' because, like the San Diego ordinance, it 
favored commercial over noncommercial speech.121 
The court's reasoning is faulty. The basis for the finding of dis-
crimination against noncommercial messages in Metromedia was the 
fact that an onsite sign exemption was apparently granted only to 
commercial owners.122 The district court acknowledged that the Bal-
timore ordinance did not create this inequity. The onsite exemption 
granted by the Baltimore ordinance restricted commercial and non-
commercial owners equally. Both commercial and noncommercial 
sign messages were restricted to the extent that they could only be 
justified as a means of identifying a given premises or an activity con-
ducted there. 
The district court recognized that the Baltimore ordinance regu-
lated signs according to their content but misunderstood the impact of 
this regulation. The court also misunderstood the plurality opinion in 
Metromedia, on which it based its opinion.123 The Baltimore ordi-
nance discriminated against speech that had no connection to the ac-
tivity conducted on a given premises. Metromedia permits such 
discrimination with respect to commercial speech:· onsite commercial 
signs may be exempted from a general ban on commercial signs.124 
Hence, the Metromedia plurality permitted a certain kind of content-
based regulation. Nevertheless, the Baltimore court concluded that 
the Baltimore ordinance was not drawri narrowly enough because it 
regulated content: "The City has advanced no arguments, and there 
appear to be none, why its interests in traffic safety and esthetics could 
not be served by a more narrowly drawn ordinance, ·regulating size 
and appearance ... [but not] content."125 The Baltimore court failed 
to recognize the different treatment afforded.to commercial and non-
commercial signs by the Metromedia plurality. The requirement that 
a regulation of commercial speech be narrowly drawn is the fourth 
prong of the Central Hudson test. 126 According to the Metromedia 
plurality, this prong of the test is easily passed by a city ordinance 
120. 538 F. Supp. at- 1187. 
121. 538 F. Supp. at 1187. 
122. The San Diego ordinance permitted any sign, commercial or noncommercial, which 
identified the premises or owner of the premises where the sign was located. However, the ordi-
nance appeared to permit onsite advertising only on commercial property. Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 n.1 (1981). Justice Brennan took issue with the plurality's 
finding that this particular provision favored commercial over noncommercial speech. 453 U.S. 
at 534-36 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
123. 538 F. Supp. at 1187. 
124. 453 U.S. at 512. 
125. 538 F. Supp. at 1187. 
126. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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designed to prohibit billboards: "If [a] city has a sufficient basis for 
believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then 
obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to 
solving the problems they create is to prohibit them."121 
The Baltimore court's contention that a regulation of size and ap-
pearance alone would sufficiently serve the city's interests reflects the 
position taken by Brennan in his Metromedia concurrence, 128 not the 
Metromedia plurality position. The primary object of both the Balti-
more and San Diego ordinances was to reduce the number of bill-
boards,. not merely to regulate their appearance. Applying a rational 
basis test, the Metromedia plurality concluded that a city could deter-
mine that permitting onsite but banning offsite commercial signs was a 
reasonabie means of reducing the number of signs.129 
The Baltimore ordinance did contain an implied discrepancy. 
While it explicitly allowed a commercial owner to display a sign ad-
vertising his products to the extent that such advertising would be part 
of the "primary identification" of his establishment, the ordinance 
made no similar reference to noncommercial advertising.130 However, 
the ordinance could certainly be interpreted as granting the same lim-
ited advertising privilege to noncommercial owners. Just as a restau-
rant could post a sign reading "Joe's Place: Hamburgers and Fries," a 
campaign headquarters could display a sign reading "Campaign to Re-
elect Jones" (or even "Reelect Jones"). 131 In any event, the district 
court did not base its finding of discrimination on this discrepancy in 
the ordinance. To be sure, a noncommercial owner could not display 
a sign communicating the ideas of others, but neither could a commer-
cial owner; nor could either owner affix a sign advertising the products 
or services of others. 
The question remains whether the Baltimore ordinance should 
have been struck down based on Metromedia. While the ordinance 
need not be read to favor commercial over noncommercial messages, it 
may restrict noncommercial speech to a degree permissible only for 
commercial speech. The Metromedia plurality emphasized that 
Supreme Court decisions prior to Metromedia had consistently given 
greater protection to noncommercial speech than to commercial 
speech. 132 This emphasis suggests that an ordinance treating them 
equally would be unconstitutional. Indeed, the opinion states that city 
127. 453 U.S. at 508. 
128. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
129. 453 U.S. at 507-12. 
130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
131. See 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, the language explicitly limit-
ing manufacturers could be taken to mean that those with noncommercial interests are to be 
given greater latitude in identifying themselves. 
132. 453 U.S. at 513. 
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officials with discretion to favor onsite over offsite commercial signs 
may not exercise similar discretion regarding noncommercial signs.133 
The fact that regulators enjoy such discretion regarding commercial 
signs "does not justify prohibiting an occupant from displaying its own 
ideas or those of others."134 This language seems to put noncommer-
cial signs beyond the reach of regulators.135 Therefore, ordinances 
that prohibit signs according to the onsite/ off site distinction or the 
identifying/nonidentifying distinction must be invalid because they re-
strict the noncommercial use of signs by all owners or occupants. The 
commercial occupant presumably may only display signs with com-
mercial content, and even the noncommercial occupant may only dis-
play signs containing certain of his own ideas. Neither type of 
occupant may display the ideas of others. The Baltimore court, de-
fending the right of an occupant to display its "[own] ideas or those of 
others,"136 appears to have been faithful to the Metromedia plurality 
opinion after all.137 
2. The Kentucky Billboard Act 
However, courts faced with billboard laws virtually identical to the 
Baltimore ordinance have had no difficulty finding language in the Me-
tromedia plurality opinion to justify upholding these ordinances. In 
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways 138 the Sixth Circuit validated 
the Kentucky Billboard Act, which prohibits all signs within 660 feet 
of highways except those signs "that contain a message relating to an 
activity or the sale of a product on the property on which they are 
located."139 The coUrt quoted much of the following passage from 
Justice White's opinion, culling the principle that billboard laws must 
treat noncommercial and commercial signs equally: 
There is a broad excep~ion for onsite commercial advertisements, but 
there is no similar exception for noncommercial speech. . . . The city 
does not explain how or wpy noncommercial billboards located in places 
where commercial billboards are permitted would be'more threatening 
to safe driving or would detract more from the beauty of the city. Inso-
far as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their 
content to commercial messages; the city may. not conclude that [com-
mercial messages are] of greater value than ... noncommercial 
133. 453 U.S. at 513. 
134. 453 U.S. at 513. 
135. In the alternative, noncommercial signs would have to be restricted under a different 
rationale. 
136. 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982). 
137. For a case following Baltimore's interpretation of Metromedia, see Matthews v. Need-
ham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985). 
138. 822 F.2d 586 (6th Cir. 1987). 
139. 822 F.2d at 588 ·(quoting 603 Ky. Admin. Regs. 3:010, § 2(3) (1975)); 
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messages.140 
An ordinance that prohibits signs .based on the onsite/offsite distinc-
tion does not suffer from these flaws. It provides the same exception 
for noncommercial signs as for commercial signs; nor does it "limit" 
sign content to commercial messages or give "greater value" to com-
mercial signs. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the San 
Diego ordinance was invalidated for two specific reasons: (1) it fa-
vored onsite commercial messages over noncommercial messages, and 
(2) it favored certain noncommercial messages over other noncommer-
cial messages. 141 • Wheeler upheld the Kentucky Billboard Act because 
it possessed neither defect: "The restrictions [imposed by the Act] 
permit any non-commercial signs as long as they relate to an activity 
on the premises."142 
It could be argued, however, that a billboard law which grants ex-
emptions for onsite signs possesses the second defect of the San Diego 
ordinance. In permitting only signs with content related to an activity 
conducted on the premises, a billboard law seems to favor one cate-
gory of noncommercial signs over all other noncommercial signs.143 
This position finds support in the Metromedia plurality opinion, which 
noted that one of the unconstitutional noncommercial exemptions 
granted by the San Diego ordinance was an exemption for signs that 
"identify any piece of property and its owner."144 But there is a diffi-
culty in treating onsite noncommercial signs as a category of noncom-
mercial signs which may not be favored over others. After all, the 
content of onsite noncommercial signs would be as varied as the non-
commercial establishments on whose premises they would be found. 
Furthermore, while it may be said that an ordinance that grants onsite 
exemptions favors those who own land within the purview of the ordi-
nance, a landowner under this ordinance has less power by virtue of 
owning land than he would where he could freely choose to display 
any sign. True, he might decide to lease space to a billboard company 
which in turn would make it available for messages of third parties, 
but he might also reserve to himself the privilege of displaying a sign 
carrying his ideas only. To assert that a billboard law ought not to 
favor landowners over nonlandowners is nonsensical, for a billboard 
must be located on someone's land. Therefore, the argument that an 
exemption for noncommercial onsite signs unduly favors one kind of 
noncommercial speech over others must be made at the level of the 
140. 822 F.2d at 593 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 
(1981) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)). 
141. 822 F.2d at 592-93. 
142. 822 F.2d 'lit 593. 
143. See supra note 111 and accompanying text, where Chief Justice Burger raised this 
argument. 
144. 453 U.S. at 514. 
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individual landowner, for it is his use of noncommercial signs that is 
restricted by such an exemption. 
The resolution of this problem depends on one's interpretation of 
the nebulous term "content-neutral." On the one hand, an exemption 
for onsite signs certainly evaluates signs with regard to their content. 
On the other hand, theoretically the exemption does not preclude any 
given message; it simply must be displayed in the appropriate place. 
Taking the latter view of content-neutrality, the Sixth Circuit in 
Wheeler argued that the Kentucky Billboard Act was not directed at 
the content of signs, but at their "secondary effects."145 Therefore, it 
deemed the regulations "valid place and manner restrictions."146 The 
court derived the doctrine of secondary effects from City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 147 where the Supreme Court upheld a zoning 
ordinance that prohibited "adult~' theaters from locating within 1000 
feet of any residential area, church, park, or school. The ordinance 
had the effect of restricting adult theaters to locations within an area 
constituting approximately five percent of the city's territory.148 De-
spite the fact that the ordinance treated adult theaters differently from 
other theaters, the Court upheld the ordinance because it was aimed at 
the secondary effects of the theaters on residential neighborhoods149 
and not at the content of the films shown.150 Writing for the Renton 
majority, then-Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the ordinance did 
not "appear to fit neatly into either the 'content-based' or the 'content-
neutral' category."151 But the majority concluded that the ordinance 
was "completely consistent" with the Court's definition of content-
neutral regulations as those that "are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech."152 By italicizing the word "justi-
fied," Rehnquist indicated that in his view a content-neutral regulation 
is a regulation free of an impermissible regulatory motive. In this way 
Rehnquist echoed the discussions of content-neutrality by Justice Ste-
vens and Chief Justice Burger in their dissents in Metromedia: a regu-
lation is content-neutral if it does not suppress a particular 
145. 822 F.2d at 590. 
146. 822 F.2d at 589-90. 
147. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
148. 475 U.S. at 53. 
149. The avowed purpose of the ordinance was to protect the city against the deleterious 
effects of adult theaters on their surroundings. These alleged effects included crime, a decline in 
retail trade and property values, and a general lessening of the quality of urban life. 475 U.S. at 
48. 
150. 475 U.S. at 47. 
151. 475 U.S. at 47. 
152. 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 
452 U.S., 640, 648 (1981). 
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viewpoint. 153 The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Wheeler, stressing 
that the purpose of the billboard act was to reduce the number of 
signs,154 not to suppress speech content: "[The] regulations apply 
evenhandedly to commercial and noncommercial speech; they dis-
criminate against no viewpoint or subject matter."155 
The Renton Court emphasized secondary effects since the Renton 
ordinance discriminated on its face against certain types of theaters. 
The Wheeler court argued that as the billboard act did not discrimi-
nate facially or otherwise, the court had no reason to invoke the secon-
dary effects doctrine. A more appropriate use of the doctrine would 
have been to argue that even if the billboard ordinance favors one cate-
gory of noncommercial speech over another, the ordinance is constitu-
tional nevertheless because it is aimed not at sign content but at the 
effects of signs on the environment. The secondary effects argument is 
nothing more than a means for focusing on regulatory motive; hence, 
it can be used as a way of defending regulatory choices that appear 
indefensible under a strict interpretation of "content-neutral." The ar-
gument reflects a broader interpretation of content-neutrality. 
Another argument for a broad reading of content-neutrality is the 
defense of exemptions on the basis of countervailing interests. The 
Wheeler court follows Burger's dissent in Metromedia in defending the 
onsite/offsite distinction as a legislative recognition of a right "inher-
ent" in land ownership to advertise an activity conducted on the prem-
ises.156 The right to display an onsite sign is claimed to be inherent in 
land ownership (but the right to display an offsite sign is not) because 
an onsite sign is confined to its location for its efficacy.157 Because an 
onsite sign identifies the premises, its message cannot be replaced by a 
sign elsewhere or by a message through a different medium.158 There-
fore, it seems that onsite signs should be constitutionally protected.159 
Wheeler argued that a prohibition of all offsite signs should not be 
153. 475 U.S. at 48-49; 453 U.S. at 552-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); 453 U.S. at 555 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 79, 84 and accompanying text. 
154. 822 F.2d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 1987). 
155. 822 F.2d at 590. 
156. 822 F.2d at 591. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
157. State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P.2d 811 (1979). 
· 158. See supra note 94 and accompanying text and infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
159. Numerous cases support a landowner's right to post a political message on his premises, 
regardless of whether this sign relates to an activity conducted on the premises. See, e.g., State v. 
Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d 821 (1980). The same widespread support cannot be found for 
onsite commercial messages. But Justice Brennan, when he wrote for the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, recognized the uniqueness of the onsite commercial sign: "The business sign is in actual-
ity a part of the business itself ..• and the authority to conduct the business in a district carries 
with it the right to maintain a business sign on the premises subject to reasonable regulations • 
• • • " United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 150, 93 A.2d 362, 365 (1952). 
Other cases protect onsite signs, commercial or noncommercial. See, e.g., State v. Lotze, 92 
Wash. 2d at 59, 593 P.2d at 815. 
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precluded by the fact that constitutionally a regulating body probably 
cannot prohibit onsite signs. 
The Wheeler and Baltimore courts exhibit contrasting views as to 
the meaning of content-neutrality in the context of signs, both claim-
ing to be faithful to Metromedia. Baltimore held that all noncommer-
cial signs must be exempted from prohibition, whereas Wheeler 
permitted prohibition of noncommercial signs if the prohibition af-
fords noncommercial signs as much protection as it affords to com-
mercial signs. Discussion as to which interpretation comports more 
fully with Metromedia will be put off until Part IV; however, the fol-
lowing section reveals a possible difficulty with the Wheeler rationale. 
B. The Rights of Occupants To Display Signs 
Metromedia did not determine the extent of occupant rights to dis-
play signs. The Court did indicate that the government can limit an 
occupant's right to display a sign where the government has a legiti-
mate interest in aesthetics and safety. In indicating that a city could 
ban offsite commercial signs while allowing onsite commercial signs, 
Metromedia permits a city to deny occupants the right to display off-
site commercial signs. This holding permits a city to deny a billboard 
leasing company its primary source of income. Beyond this, the Court 
did not indicate how else, if at all, an occupant's right to display signs 
may be restricted. The Court did say that the rationale enabling a city 
to favor onsite over offsite commercial signs did not permit the city to 
prohibit "an occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of 
others."160 While this assertion suggests that a different rationale 
might enable a city to restrict noncommercial signs, 161 Baltimore in-
terprets this language as establishing a constitutional right to display 
noncommercial signs on one's property.162 
The holding in Baltimore appears to be consistent with the fact 
that ordinances that prohibit political signs from residential areas 
"have uniformly been held unconstitutional."163 The uniformity of 
these cases appears to be based on a conviction that occupants who are 
prohibited from displaying political signs on their residential premises 
do not have adequate alternative channels for communicating the 
messages on these signs.164 In Baldwin v. Redwood City, which dealt 
with political campaign signs, the following rationale was given: 
[M]eans of political communication are not entirely fungible; political 
160. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981). 
161. See supra section 111.A.2. 
162. 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982). 
163. State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 413, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (1980); see also Matthews v. Town 
of Needham, 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1373 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
164. Miller, 83 N.J. at 413, 416 A.2d at 827. 
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posters have unique advantages. Their use may be localized to a degree 
that radio anci newspaper advertising may not. With exception of hand-
bills, they are the least expensive means by which a candidate may 
achieve name recognition among voters in a local election.165 
The ordinance at issue in State v. Miller prohibited in residential 
areas all signs except those identifying the occupants or the address of 
a given site, those advertising the sale or rental of a given site, and 
those identifying firms at work on a given site.166 The defendant in 
Miller displayed a sign reading as follows: 
WELCOME!! PROSPECTIVE RESIDENTS OF LAWRENCE 
BROOK GLEN[:] THIS RESIDENT AND OTHERS OF RIVA AVE. 
WANT TO WELCOME YOU TO THIS FLOOD HAZARD AREA. 
GOOD LUCK!! INFORMATION AVAILABLE.161 
Identifying the sign as political speech, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
agreed with the defendant that the sign was the only "realistic alterna-
tive for reaching prospective purchasers of homes in the affected 
area."168 The court went on to assert that unless a regulation with-
stands strict scrutiny, political speech "is and must be permitted 
everywhere."169 
It must be emphasized that a noncommercial sign placed by an 
occupant on the land he occupies is not an "onsite sign" as defined in 
this Note (and by the court decisions addressed in this Note that use 
the term) unless the sign refers to products, services, or activities re-
lated to the premises.17° Hence, the typical political campaign sign on 
a front lawn would not be an onsite sign. Consequently, court deci-
sions such as Wheeler which permit the prohibition of signs according 
to a distinction between onsite and offsite signs deny to an occupant 
the right to post a noncommercial sign on his or her property. Indeed, 
the appellees in Wheeler wanted to display a religious or political sign 
on their property within the protected area along a state highway, but 
were denied a permit.111 
An important question is whether Wheeler can be reconciled with 
cases like Miller and Baldwin. The denial of an occupant's right to 
post a political sign by the Wheeler court can be explained perhaps by 
the fact that the occupant wanted to post a sign facing a highway, not 
a municipal street. The Baldwin court emphasized the "local" effect a 
municipal sign achieves. 172 The Miller court argued persuasively that 
the residential sign at issue was the only effective means of reaching 
165. 540 F.2d at 1J68. 
166. 83 N.J. at 406, 416 A.2d at 823. 
167. 83 N.J. at 406, 416 A.2d at 823. 
168. 83 N.J. at 414, 416 A.2d at 827. 
169. 83 N.J. at 416, 416 A.2d at 828. 
170. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
171. 822 F.2d 586, 588 (6th Cir. 1987). 
172. 540 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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the defendant's intended local audience: prospective purchasers of 
houses nearby.173 In Wheeler, it could be argued, the appellees wished 
merely to take advantage of a captive audience: motorists on a high-
way adjacent to the plaintiffs' property. Moreover, as the Wheeler 
court argued, alternative means of communication were available; be-
cause the restrictions applied only to protected areas along certain 
highways, political signs could be displayed elsewhere in the vicinity. 
Therefore, the court found that the regulation did not deny the appel-
lees a "reasonable opportunity" to display a political sign.174 
Wheeler cannot be reconciled with the cases concerning residential 
political signs unless one can justify providing greater protection to 
political signs along residential streets than to signs along certain high-
ways. As indicated above, this added protection has been justified 
when the residential sign has a "local" thrust such that other means of 
communication cannot target people in the limited area. But not all 
residential signs have this local thrust. Moreover, a political sign 
along a highway could have greater significance to a given locale than 
a particular residential sign. Therefore, there appears to be no reason 
why residential political signs as a class should be (avored over polit-
ical signs along a highway.11s 
The operative criterion in determining whether a government may 
prohibit a sign is whether alternative means of communication exist. 
If alternative means are generally less available for residential signs, it 
would be because residential signs tend to depend for their efficacy on 
the particular premises on which they are situated. This is the pri-
mary characteristic of the onsite sign.176 Therefore, a strong argument 
could be made for exempting those residential signs with this charac-
teristic from a general prohibition of o:ffsite signs. Of course, to make 
such distinctions requires a consideration of "content" in order to as-
sess the relationship between the message and the land on which it is 
located.177 Metromedia appears to have prohibited such an assessment 
where noncommercial speech is concerned.178 But to exempt only res-
173. 83 N.J. at 413-14, 416 A.2d at 827. 
174. 822 F.2d at 596 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,_~75 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)). 
175. The First Circuit has argued that "deprivation of highway opportunities [for communi-
cation] is not as legally objectionable as some other curtailments," for highways were created 
with taxpayers' money to enhance travel, not to enhance advertising. John Donnelly & Sons v. 
Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 1980). However, the argument applies equally to curtailments 
along residential streets. Moreover, the First Circuit utilized this argument only in connection 
with curtailments of commercial speech. 639 F.2d at 14. 
176. See supra notes 10, 158 and accompanying text. It is also the primary characteristic of a 
larger category of signs: identifying signs. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. 
177. The word "content" is in quotation marks because whether or not an assessment of 
content is content-neutral is the heart of the conflict between Justice White and the dissenters in 
Metromedia (see supra Part II) and between the Baltimore and Wheeler courts (see supra section 
III.A). 
178. The four plurality justices and the two concurring justices probably would have agreed 
on this point. 
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idential political ·signs from a general ban on off site signs is even less 
defensible by Metromedia standards.179 Thus, Metromedia allows no 
compromise between Wheeler and a case such as Miller. 
The Sixth Circuit has also applied the Wheeler rationale to a city 
ordinance. Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion 180 upheld an ordi-
nance based on the onsite/offsite distinction. The ordinance permitted 
onsite and offsite signs in the industrial district of Lake Orion but al-
lowed only onsite signs, commercial and noncommercial, in the retail 
district.181 The ordinance also created an exemption for temporary 
political signs throughout the village.182 This exemption may prevent 
conflict between Rzadkowolski and Miller. Miller asserted merely that 
political signs may not be excluded from residential districts.183 To 
allow these signs at certain times is to avoid the charge of total exclu-
sion. However, six Metromedia justices held that twelve exemptions 
(including one for temporary political campaign signs) invalidated the 
San Diego ordinance because they indicated a preference for one type 
of noncommercial speech over others. Hence, the exemption in 
Rzadkowolski should have rendered the Lake Orion ordinance invalid. 
Inexplicably, the Sixth Circuit merely mentions this exemption but 
does nothing to justify it.184 
Moreover, a defense of Rzadkowolski must explain why offsite 
political signs are only permitted on a temporary basis while onsite 
commercial signs may be permanent. By Metromedia standards, this 
defense cannot be made: commercial speech may not be favored over 
noncommercial speech. The exemption in Rzadkowolski undercuts 
the purpose of the onsite/offsite distinction: that is, to treat commer-
cial and noncommercial signs equally. 185 This principle of equal treat-
ment precludes exemptions. Therefore, the onsite/offsite rationale of 
Rzadkowolski and Wheeler cannot protect the right of an occupant to 
display a residential political sign. 
If regulators want to protect the rights defended in Miller and 
Baldwin (and they may be required by the Constitution to do so), it 
seems they must, under the dictates of Metromedia, exempt all non-
179. The four plurality justices and the two concurring justices definitely agreed on this 
point. 
180. 845 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1988). 
181. 845 F.2d at 654. 
182. 845 F.2d at 654. 
183. 83 N.J. 402, 413, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. 1980). 
184. 845 F.2d at 654. The court might have argued that unlike the exemptions in Me· 
tromedia, an exemption for any temporary political sign does not favor one type of noncommer-
cial sign over any other, for all noncommercial signs contain some "political" content for first 
amendment purposes. The similar exemption in Metromedia specified that the temporary sign 
had to be connected with a political campaign. 453 U.S. 490, 495 n.3 (1981). The Rzadkowolski 
exemption applies to any political sign and hence does not discriminate between types of non-
commercial signs. 
185. Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 593 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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commercial signs from sign prohibitions. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger 
argued that the plurality opinion in Metromedia left regulators with a 
choice between banning all signs or exempting noncommercial signs 
from any prohibition of signs regardless of their impact on safety or 
the environment.186 But, as the next section shows, even when an or-
dinance exempts all noncommercial signs from a billboard ban, 
problems remain. 
C. Discriminatory Effect on Noncommercial Signs 
In Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh 187 the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a city ordinance that prohibited offsite commer-
cial signs from certain zones within the city. The ordinance exempted 
noncommercial signs from regulation in order "to eliminate any po-
tential constitutionality problems."188 Indeed, the exemption for non-
commercial signs allowed the city to avoid the controversies analyzed 
in section III.A and section III.B of this Note, controversies stemming 
from the difficulty of determining at what point noncommercial speech 
has been properly protected when commercial exemptions have been 
granted. Consequently, the plaintiff billboard company in Raleigh was 
compelled to argue atypically, advancing one old argument and one 
new one. 
The old argument had been the heart of Justice Brennan's concur-
rence in Metromedia: the danger of allowing a government official to 
determine whether a sign is commercial or noncommercial.189 The 
plaintiff in Raleigh argued that the regulation did not provide enough 
guidance to officials because it did not define "commercial" and "non-
commercial."190 The Raleigh court contended that definitions were 
unnecessary because the Supreme Court had already supplied them, 191 
and it maintained that the "occasional marginal case" where uncer-
tainty existed should not invalidate the regulation for vagueness.192 
The court might have added that only two Metromed(a justices, Bren-
nan and Blackmun, were concerned with this problem. 
The new argument advanced by the plaintiff in Raleigh was that 
the ordinance preferred commercial speech over noncommercial 
speech because the ordinance would lead to the virtual disappearance 
186. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 99 and accompanying 
text. 
187. 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986). 
188. 792 F.2d at 1271 n.2 (quoting Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 
621 F. Supp. 1446, 1448 (E.D. N.C. 1985)). 
189. 453 U.S. 490, 536-37 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
190. 792 F.2d at 1272. 
191. The Court defined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Blee. v. Public Serv. Commn., 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
192. 792 F.2d at 1272-73. 
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of noncommercial signs.193 The ordinance would destroy the bill-
board industry, and billboards often provide the only means of dis-
playing noncommercial signs. Thus, though the ordinance exempted 
noncommercial signs from direct regulation, the ordinance indirectly 
burdened noncommercial signs more than commercial signs.194 
The Raleigh court stated that even if this discriminatory effect oc-
curred, it would have derived "from decisions of the individual prop-
erty owners" and not from the ordinance itself which "by its very 
terms does not affect non-commercial signs."195 Therefore, the court 
argued that the city may not be held responsible for such results.196 
This discriminatory effect argument (despite no facial discrimina-
tion) was urged by Justice Brennan in his Metromedia concurring 
opinion. Brennan disagreed with the plurality's view that an ordi-
nance, such as the one in Raleigh, which bans offsite commercial signs 
but permits all noncommercial signs would be constitutional.197 De-
spite the noncommercial sign exemption, Brennan would treat the or-
dinance as a total ban of offsite signs if the ban on commercial signs 
resulted in a virtual ban on noncommercial signs.198 
Only one court has struck down a billboard law due to its discrimi-
natory effect on noncommercial speech. This decision, Jackson v. City 
Council of Charlottesville, 199 invalidated an ordinance that exempted 
all onsite signs, both commercial and noncommercial, but did not ex-
empt offsite noncommercial signs.200 The Jackson court argued that 
"[w]hile the ordinance in Metromedia differs somewhat inform from 
the local ordinance challenged in this case, a careful analysis of the 
two ordinances shows that each reaches the same result, i.e., the vir-
tual prohibition of noncommercial advertising .... "201 While the 
court admitted that the language of the ordinance permits onsite non-
commercial signs, it asserted: "[C]learly the general scheme of the 
sign ordinance is to prohibit all but on-premises commercial advertis-
ing."202 The court claimed, illogically, that the ordinance, despite its 
facial neutrality, was unconstitutional "on its face."203 
193. 792 F.2d at 1271-73. 
194. 792 F.2d at 1273. 
195. 792 F.2d at 1273. 
196. 792 F.2d at 1273. 
197. 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
198. 453 U.S. at 536 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
199. 659 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Va. 1987), modified on other grounds, 840 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
200. The Jackson rationale, because it looks only to the result of an ordinance and not to 
what it says, also could be applied to an ordinance like that in Raleigh which exempts all non· 
commercial signs. 
201. 659 F. Supp. at 473 n.3 (emphasis added). 
202. 659 F. Supp. at 472 n.1. The word "scheme" suggests that the court suspected the city 
of intending to rid itself indirectly of noncommercial signs. 
203. 659 F. Supp. at 474. 
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The defendant city council in Jackson argued that Metromedia 
did not apply because the Charlottesville ordinance was content-
neutral. 204 The court did not attempt to determine the extent to which 
content-neutrality might be a function of what an ordinance says as 
opposed to what it effects. Rather, the court noted the defendant's 
reliance on Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, a 
Supreme Court decision which upheld a city's ban of posters on public 
property as a content-neutral restriction,2°5 but found this reliance 
wanting: "[The] defendant's reliance on Vincent is misplaced because 
the sign ordinance at issue here is not the kind of absolute prohibition 
permitted by Vincent. " 206 The Jackson court thus implied that an or-
dinance can only be content-neutral if it constitutes an absolute prohi-
bition. The reasoning of Vincent suggests nothing of the kind: "The 
text of the ordinance is neutral - indeed it is silent - concerning any 
speaker's point of view, and . . . it has been applied . . . in an even-
handed manner."207 The above passage makes clear that content-neu-
trality depends upon the "text" of an ordinance and its enforcement, 
not upon its indirect effects.208 Hence, the Jackson ordinance was con-
tent-neutral. 
Therefore, the discriminatory effect argument cannot disturb the 
essence of the Raleigh holding: a billboard law is valid if it exempts all 
noncommercial signs. The Jackson court might have pointed out that, 
strictly speaking, the holding in Metromedia depended not on the San 
Diego ordinance's lack of content-neutrality, but rather on its prefer-
ence for commercial over noncommercial signs.209 It would then have 
been possible to assert that impermissible favoring of commercial 
speech can occur despite content-neutrality due to the impact of an 
ordinance. Indeed, something is amiss when a court can accept both a 
fundamental principle - noncommercial speech deserves greater pro-
tection than commercial speech - and results inconsistent with the 
principle. Metromedia forced this result by simultaneously adhering 
to the principle and asserting a city's right to reduce the number of 
outdoor signs. As Jackson demonstrates, and as Brennan's Me-
tromedia argument implied, if one seriously intends to protect non-
commercial signs, one must protect commercial billboards. But, by 
the same logic, if governments have the right to prohibit some bill-
boards for aesthetic purposes, then the principle of affording greater 
204. 659 F. Supp. at 473. 
205. 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). 
206. 659 F. Supp. at 473. 
207. 466 U.S. at 804. 
208. The ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres was also deemed content-neutral 
despite the fact that, due to financial constraints, the adult theater in question would most likely 
be unable to relocate in the only section of the city left open to it. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). But see 
Renton, 415 U.S. at 64-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
209. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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protection to noncommercial speech should not apply to billboard 
laws. Part IV makes this argument. 
IV. JUSTIFYING PROHIBITIONS AND EXEMPTIONS 
We have seen that the Metromedia plurality did not draw a clear 
line between those signs that could be prohibited and those that could 
not be. Metromedia appears to support two divergent views on the 
matter. One view draws the line between commercial and noncom-
mercial signs. The other permits prohibition of noncommercial signs 
if the ordinance affords noncommercial signs at least as much protec-
tion as it affords commercial signs. As shown above in section III.A, 
these two views rest on divergent notions of "content-neutrality." The 
commercial/noncommercial distinction disallows restrictions on non-
commercial signs that in any way depend on what a sign says or what 
function the sign serves. The opposing view - reflected in both the 
onsite/o:ffsite distinction and the identifying/nonidentifying distinc-
tion - requires only that the restriction not discriminate according to 
point of view or subject matter. For instance, the narrow view of con-
tent-neutrality would not permit an exemption for any class of sign, 
even if the class potentially includes any message from any point of 
view, because a sign's content would have to be assessed in order to 
determine its class. Conversely, the broader view of content-neutrality 
would allow an exemption for a class of signs - onsite signs (or identi-
fying signs) - as long as every sign within that class was exempt. 
This Part, in evaluating the commercial/noncommercial distinction 
and the onsite/o:ffsite distinction as principles by which to justify 
prohibitions of signs and exemptions from these prohibitions, argues 
that neither distinction proves adequate. This Part then advocates a 
third distinction as the most appropriate standard: a distinction be-
tween signs that identify the premises on which they are located and 
signs that do not. 
A. Inadequacies of the Commercial/Noncommercial Distinction 
The benefits in employing the commercial/noncommercial distinc-
tion are plain: (1) it stresses the principle that noncommercial speech 
should be afforded greater protection than commercial speech; (2) it 
avoids the inevitable constitutional disputes arising from favoring one 
kind of noncommercial speech over another; (3) it avoids the difficulty 
of justifying favoring one type of noncommercial speech over another; 
and ( 4) it does not thwart the government objective of limiting out-
door display signs, for noncommercial billboards are virtually elimi-
nated indirectly when commercial billboards are prohibited.210 Thus, 
210. See supra notes 69, 194 and accompanying text. Of course, this fourth benefit is only 
considered such by someone who believes the aesthetic objectives of sign prohibitions outweigh 
the countervailing free speech claims. 
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the commercial/noncommercial distinction seems to yield the best of 
all possible solutions for a court hoping to strike a compromise: it 
maintains the principle that noncommercial (political) speech is espe-
cially valuable while allowing governments to eliminate virtually all 
offsite signs. But the principled protection for political speech rings 
hollow when courts rely conveniently on market forces to accomplish 
indirectly what they will not do directly.211 Additionally, the com-
mercial/noncommercial distinction may not even satisfy those who 
would prohibit signs on aesthetic grounds, for the exemption of all 
noncommercial signs from prohibition presents a host of potential reg-
ulatory problems. 
A compromise that depends on something as changeable as market 
forces is precarious. If these forces change, allowing billboard compa-
nies to thrive on noncommercial messages, the governmental objective 
to improve appearances by prohibiting billboards will be utterly 
thwarted. Justice Brennan noted that if commercial entities want to 
utilize billboards where commercial signs have been prohibited, they 
will circumvent the commercial/noncommercial distinction with non-
commercial messages designed to advertise their names and prod-
ucts. 212 However it may happen, noncommercial billboards could 
spring up in great numbers where governments had previously re-
moved the perceived blight of commercial billboards. The subsequent 
blight will be no less perceptible by virtue of its noncommercial con-
tent. Governments and courts will then be restrained from acting by 
Metromedia (and one branch of its progeny), which failed to face di-
rectly the conflict between governmental interests and communicative 
interests presented by the billboard, commercial or noncommercial. 
But even if noncommercial billboards never present a problem due 
to their numbers, the exemption for all noncommercial signs ensures 
that these signs cannot be prohibited no matter how intrusive they are 
to aesthetic interests and no matter what their location, message, or 
function.213 Obviously, government cannot routinely protect citizens 
from unpleasant speech. The maintenance of free speech requires that 
offensive speech must often be tolerated.214 But offensive speech need 
not be tolerated under all circumstances;215 and a number of factors 
indicate that signs should receive less protection than other media. 
The Supreme Court has observed that billboards "are constantly 
before the eyes of observers on the streets ... to be seen without the 
211. Despite assertions to the contrary, Metromedia did not protect noncommercial bill-
boards. See supra section 111.C. 
212. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
213. 453 U.S. at 556, 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
214. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
215. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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exercise of choice or volition on their part," and that their messages 
are "thrust upon [observers] by all the arts and devices that skill can 
produce."216 Unlike advertisements in magazines and newspapers, 
which are seen only after some effort by the reader to turn the pages, 
or on the radio, which can be turned off, billboard messages cannot be 
avoided.217 Signs are intended to catch one's eye. When something 
new, offensive, large, or unusual comes into view, one simply looks. If 
one then chooses to look away, one does so knowing the sign is there. 
This presence compels its audience either to include it in its gaze or to 
forfeit the opportunity to look in that general direction. 
Dissenting in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonvil/e, 218 Chief Justice 
Burger argued similarly that passers-by offended by nudity on a drive-
in movie screen plainly visible from the street should not have the 
burden of having to look away.219 But if this argument failed in 
Erznoznik, where the city ordinance clearly intended to control the 
content of the movies shown, 220 it should prevail where sign prohibi-
tions target only the signs themselves and not their content. For this 
reason, Professor John Costonis has argued that first amendment val-
ues are not "seriously threatened" by billboard bans.221 Noting that in 
Metromedia Justice White distinguished between a billboard's "com-
municative and non:communicative. aspects,"222 and that no justice 
took issue with that distinction, Costonis argues that the justices 
should have denied first amendment protection to billboards by re-
garding them as "aesthetic entities" and not speech. 223 Costonis 
points out that no one disputed that San Diego opposed billboards 
because they "were perceived as associationally dissonant with San Di-
ego's character," and not because of the messages they conveyed.224 
In addition to producing the twin problems of exempting noncom-
mercial signs regardless of their effects and failing to protect noncom-
mercial signs despite the appearance of doing so, the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinction fails to address the question whether ade-
quate alternative means exist for a given sign. Thus, the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinction produces legislation blind to the unique 
needs of particular individuals who want to display a sign.22s 
It matters a great deal where certain signs are placed. A stop sign 
216. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932). 
217. 285 U.S. at 110. 
218. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
219. 422 U.S. at 218-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
220. 422 U.S. at 206-07. 
221. Costonis, supra note 3, at 449 n.336. 
222. 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981). 
223. Costonis, supra note 3, at 447-48. 
224. Id. at 448. However, emphasizing associational dissonance (or inconsistency) has its 
drawbacks. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for Burger's discussion of "special needs." 
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is useless unless placed where the government requires cars to stop. 
The efficacy of other signs does not depend on their location, at least 
not in the same way. An offsite commercial sign along a highway that 
advertises services and goods available at a given exit must be placed 
prior to the exit but may be placed at any of a large number of such 
sites. A noncommercial sign asking for donations to a particular cause 
will naturally be most effective in a location where the most people 
will see it (or where the most people prone to making a donation will 
see it), but, again, such a sign need not be displayed at any particular 
place. It conveys its message regardless of its location. Conversely, 
like the stop sign, the onsite sign (or the identifying sign) must be dis-
played in a particular place because its function is to identify that 
place in some way, to tell its viewer that he has arrived at a given 
place.226 
The commercial/noncommercial distinction implies that the right 
to display a noncommercial sign is a right concomitant with owning or 
occupying prop~rty.227 But ifthere is a right to display a sign concom-
itant with owning or occupying, property, this right should extend to 
commercial signs. The Metromedia plurality, in granting San Diego 
the discretion to value some commercial communicative interests over 
others,228 theoretically granted the discretion to prohibit onsite com-
mercial signs under certain circumstances. The storeowner denied the 
right to advertise his store with an onsite sign will receive little conso-
lation in learning that he may substitute any noncommercial message 
he wishes for his ill-fated onsite sign. To assert in this case that non-
commercial speech must receive greater protection than commercial 
speech under the first amendment229 is to blind oneself to gross ineq-
uity. Although regulators may be unlikely to deny storeowners their 
onsite signs, the fact that they could reveals the inherent inadequacy of 
the commercial/noncommercial distinction to justify prohibitions in 
the case of signs: it takes no account of the function a sign performs. 
Similarly, the commercial/noncommercial distinction cannot ex-
plain why a government may display traffic signs but not political 
signs. If "owning" or possessing land creates a right to display non-
commercial signs thereon, a government should be able to display any 
noncommercial message where it displays traffic signs. But this is ob-
viously not the case. Government may not "control ... the search for 
political truth."230 If a city challenged the.state's right to display traf-
fic signs within the city, a court undoubtedly would justify the traffic 
226. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
228. 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). 
229. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513. 
230. 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 
530, 538 (1980)). 
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signs in terms of the function they perform. The court would probably 
find both that the state had a compelling interest in dfrecting motorists 
and that the state was not attempting to influence public debate.231 
Moreover, when ownership or occupancy of property triggers the 
right to display noncommercial signs, it is impossible to distinguish 
between the rights of billboard companies and the rights of residents. 
A billboard company owns or leases the space on which it displays 
signs to the same degree as a resident owns or leases his property. 
However, cases such as Baldwin and Miller 232 support our intuitive 
sense that the homeowner has a greater speech right than the billboard 
company where signs are concerned. What explains this intuitive 
sense? First, the homeowner generally displays his own messages, not 
the messages of others. Second, the homeowner usually lives where he 
displays his sign; he must tolerate, along with his neighbors, any un-
pleasant side effects of his sign. 233 Third, and most important to Bald-
win and Miller, the homeowner may have no means other than his sign 
to further his communicative interest.234 Determinations made under 
the commercial/noncommercial distinction ignore these three factors. 
As the foregoing examples indicate, the commercial/noncommer-
cial distinction takes no account of whether ample alternative means 
of communication are available to someone wishing to display a sign. 
Indeed, the Metromedia plurality permitted San Diego to prohibit cer-
tain commercial signs despite admitting that alternative means ap-
peared to be unavailable.235 The storeowner's identifying sign is 
essentially irreplaceable,236 yet in theory it is not protected. Con-
versely, the commercial/noncommercial distinction obliges govern-
ments to protect each noncommercial sign regardless of the fact that 
its message could be conveyed through another medium. 
In justifying the commercial/noncommercial distinction, one 
might stress the difficulty in defining "ample alternative means." If 
Metromedia is any indication, the phrase represents a conclusion as to 
the validity or invalidity of an ordinance rather than a standard by 
which to judge that validity.237 Justice White merely relied on a joint 
statement of the parties to the effect that people use billboards because 
they are relatively inexpensive and efficient.238 But, presumably, cost 
231. By contrast, the reasoning of the Metromedia plurality suggests that if the government 
chooses to erect directional signs, it cannot deny anyone else the right to erect any noncommer· 
cial sign. To conclude otherwise is to favor one type of noncommercial speech over any other. 
232. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text. 
233. Naturally, the neighbors are more likely than the sign displayer to find the side effects 
unpleasant or unjustifiable. 
234. See section III.B. 
235. 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981). 
236. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
238. 453 U.S. at 516. 
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and efficiency influence any choice of medium. We would hardly be 
surprised to find that people have practical reasons for selecting the 
medium they select. Therefore, accepting cost and efficiency as stan-
dards could easily result in a finding that ample alternative means 
never exist. 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres held that only a "reasonable 
opportunity" to communicate in another way need be available and 
that financial limitations alone do not entitle one to utilize the pre-
ferred alternative.239 However, financial limitations coupled with a 
general inability to reach an audience can be sufficient to protect a 
means of communicating "the poorly financed causes of little peo-
ple.''240 Chief Justice Burger argued that inadequate alternatives exist 
only when a party can demonstrate that his message is relatively dis-
advantaged compared to the messages conveyed by other means.241 
At least in the case of signs, this standard seems too limited, for it 
would ignore the problem of the storeowner denied an onsite sign. 
Having the financial means to advertise does not solve his problem. 
Neither the ample alternative means test nor the reasonable oppor-
tunity test provide assistance to a court unless they mean tp.at a sign 
displayer, in order to qualify for the court's protection, must show that 
he has either (1) financial limitations coupled with a general inability 
to reach an audience, or (2) an identifying sign. Consequently, this 
test should be the test for whether ample alternative means of commu-
nication exist. In effect, a court should ask not whether ample alterna-
tives exist, but whether any alternatives exist. · 
Of course, it may also be quite unreasonable for a government to 
prohibit certain nonidentifying signs. But if the prohibitfon is unrea-
sonable, it would be for reasons other than a lack of ample alternative 
means of communication. For instance, Baldwin v. Redwood City ar-
gued that residential political campaign signs have a local objective 
that cannot be accomplished readily by other means.242 But Baldwin 
acknowledged that handbills also would have accomplished the sign 
displayer's objective.243 For that matter, going door-to-door may be 
the most effective way to reach a local audience. What rendered these 
alternatives inadequate? Apparently, the court simply concluded that 
people should have the right to. display such signs; that they should 
not have to hand out leaflets or walk d<?or-to-door. One might argue 
that political lawn signs have long been used, or that such signs repre-
sent active participation in the democratic process. But a court cannot 
logically base this right on a lack of alternative means, for "ample" 
239. 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). . 
240. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
241. 453 U.S. at 563 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
242. See supra note 165 and accompanying text .. 
243. Id. 
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means nothing in this context. If alternatives exist, by definition they 
must be ample, for cost and efficiency cannot be considered (unless the 
inquiry is whether or not the complainant's sign furthered a poorly 
financed cause "of little people"). 
B. The Superiority of the Identifying/Nonidentifying Distinction 
Section IV.A indicates that the commercial/noncommercial dis-
tinction is inappropriate because it does not consider a sign's function 
or its relationship to the land on which it is displayed. Thus, it ignores 
the only measure by which to determine whether alternative means of 
communication exist for someone who wants to display a sign. The 
onsite/o:ffsite distinction is superior to the commercial/noncommer-
cial distinction because, in protecting onsite signs, it takes a sign's 
function into account. Additionally, the onsite/o:ffsite distinction 
gives greater leeway to local aesthetic interests, allowing governments 
to ban all o:ffsite signs. In contrast, the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction removes aesthetic consideration from a court's determina-
tion: it protects each noncommercial sign regardless of whether it is 
more offensive or intrusive aesthetically (given its placement) than a 
commercial sign. 
Although the onsite/ off site distinction is preferable to the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction, it fails to include other signs that 
should be protected under the rationale needed to protect onsite signs. 
Onsite signs deserve protection from sign bans because, as they iden-
tify the premises on which they are displayed, they cannot be replaced 
by an alternative means of communication.244 Therefore, all identify-
ing signs - not just onsite signs - should be protected. 
Recall that an onsite sign is a sign that refers to or identifies the 
activities conducted, the services provided, or the products sold or dis-
pensed on the premises.245 Therefore, the onsite/o:ffsite distinction 
would not protect "for sale" or "for lease" signs unless the property 
were considered a product sold on the premises.246 Nor would it pro-
tect political signs such as the sign in Miller whose message required 
for its conveyance that the sign be disl'layed on a given premises.247 
244. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
246. It might be argued that the definition for onsite signs could easily be amended so as to 
include "for sale" signs; hence, "for sale" signs as a class of signs do not demonstrate the need for 
the identifying/nonidentifying distinction. But "for sale" signs may be divided into two types: 
the signs placed on property in order to entice would-be purchasers to inquire on the premises 
and the signs that direct would-be purchasers to another location for information. The former 
might very well be deemed onsite signs, but not the latter. In either case the signs identify a piece 
of property for sale (or lease). Therefore, it would be impractical and inequitable for a regulntion 
to permit one type but not the other, and yet this would be the result of the application of the 
onsite/ offsite distinction. 
247. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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Signs that identify the occupant of the premises and not the prem-
ises itself create a separate problem. The onsite/ off site distinction 
would not protect a residential sign indicating the occupant's name. 
Nor would it protect a sign identifying the firm engaged in construc-
tion or other work on the premises on which it is located. One avoids 
this problem by recognizing the identifying sign as the category of sign 
requiring protection. Signs that identify the occupants of a premises 
also identify the premises. 
By extension; it might then be argued that the political campaign 
sign on a front lawn should be protected because it identifies the occu-
pants as being people who intend to vote for a particular candidate, 
and thereby identifies the premises. But two difficulties arise from this 
reasoning. First, the political campaign sign communicates informa-
tion about the occupant that cannot be said in turn to indicate any-
thing integral to the premises. By contrast, a sign that names an 
occupant or owner provides what might be termed "primary identifi.-
cation"248 of the premises; it provides one of the basic pieces of infor-
mation to be learned about a tract ofland: who lives or works there or 
who owns it. Most importantly, the sign that names the occupant of 
the premises tells its viewer that he has arrived at a given place. It 
would be an unusual political sign, such as the sign in Miller, which 
would serve this function. 
Second, to include political campaign signs among signs that iden-
tify premises would be to include any residential political sign in this 
group, ·for every residential political sign is intended to indicate an 
occupant's perspective on some issue. The distinction between signs 
that identify a given premises and signs that do not would lose signifi-
cance if it were expanded to include every sign that indicates some-
thing about the occupant of the land on which the sign is located. If 
political signs are to be protect~, they must be protected under a dif-
ferent rationale. 249 
The foregoing makes clear that the best justification for exempting 
signs from a general ban is the distinction between signs that identify 
premises and signs that do not.250 At bottom, this distinction is a mea-
sure by which to determine whether ample alternative means of com-
munication exist. The distinction stems from the fact that an 
identifying sign cannot be replaced by another medium. Like the on-
248. See discussion in section III.A of Baltimore, in which a city ordinance distinguished 
onsite signs from offsite signs by permitting only those signs which provided "primary identifica-
tion" of a premises. 
249. Because the identifying/nonidentifying distinction functions according to a broad view 
of content-neutrality, it is consistent with permitting governments to exempt certain nonidentify-
ing signs from a general ban for independent reasons. Infra note 2S9 and accompanying text. 
Metromedia, 4S3 U.S. 490, SSS (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
2SO. Essentially, this was the standard San Diego intended to employ. Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 8S8 n.6, 610 P.2d 407, 411 n.6, 164 Cal. Rptr. SlO, Sl4 n.6. 
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site/offsite distinction, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction can-
not be reconciled with a strict view of content-neutrality, for it 
necessarily favors identifying content over nonidentifying content. As 
has been shown, certain courts have reconciled the onsite/offsite dis-
tinction with the Metromedia holding, though not without diffi-
culty.251 These difficulties become more pronounced when the 
identifying/nonidentifying distinction is applied. 
First, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction repudiates the Me-
tromedia plurality's claim that it matters whether a sign's message is 
commercial or noncommercial. Second, while Metromedia arguably 
may not require an exemption for all noncommercial signs, it assur-
edly did not permit evaluating signs according to their functions. In-
deed, the Metromedia plurality included signs "used to identify any 
piece of property and its owner" in a catalogue of invalid noncommer-
cial exemptions.252 Recognizing that Metromedia took no account of 
a sign's function, the First Circuit in Matthews v. Town of Needham 253 
found the onsite/offsite distinction invalid precisely because it rests on 
a preference for signs based on the function they perform. The court 
argued that "preference for the 'functions' of certain signs over those 
of other (e.g., political) signs is really nothing more than a preference 
based on content."254 Despite language in the Metromedia plurality 
opinion suggesting the plausibility of an interpretation justifying the 
onsite/offsite distinction,255 this interpretation ultimately breaks 
down. Therefore, the commercial/noncommercial distinction appears 
to be more consistent with Metromedia than the onsite/offsite 
distinction. 256 
C. Implications of Accepting the Identifying/Nonidentifying 
Distinction 
This Note has argued that a city or state may not prohibit identify-
ing signs because these signs are the only signs that cannot be replaced 
by alternative communicative means. No medium but an identifying 
sign can tell the viewer that he has arrived at a particular place or that 
the land or property he views has certain characteristics. However, 
this Note does not argue that if a government wants to ban signs, it 
must ban all but identifying signs in order to observe standards of 
equal protection. 
The identifying/nonidentifying distinction functions according to 
the broad view of content-neutrality espoused by Stevens and Burger 
251. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
252. 453 U.S. at 514. 
253. 764 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1985). 
254. 764 F.2d at 60 (emphasis omitted). 
255. 453 U.S. at 503, 508, 512-13. 
256. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
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in their Metromedia dissents. According to this view, a government 
may prohibit signs as long as the prohibition does not discriminate 
against viewpoint or against controversial subject matter, and as long 
as ample alternative means of communication are available. 257 The 
identifying/nonidentifying distinction regulates according to content, 
favoring identifying content over nonidentifying content. But this reli-
ance on content does not reflect an attempt to control public debate by 
prohibiting or exempting signs conveying controversial subjects. In-
deed, the identifying/nonidentifying distinction merely provides a 
standard for determining whether adequate alternative means exist,258 
the second prong of the Stevens/Burger test. 
As both Stevens and Burger argued, a state or city may have in-
dependent reasons for exempting certain nonidentifying signs from a 
general ban.259 For instance, a state might reasonably decide to ban 
billboards along highways generally but permit government signs con-
veying information especially useful to motorists, such as notice of 
food, gas, or lodging at upcoming exits. Or, for aesthetic reasons, a 
city might reasonably distinguish temporary signs from permanent 
signs, or signs in residential areas from signs in commercial areas. Or, 
a city might permit residential lawn signs of any kind, believing the 
usefulness of such signs to displayer and viewer in a local area out-
weighs the aesthetic interest in banning them. 
Of course, there must exist a rational connection between the regu-
lation and its purpose. A city that exempts commercial nonidentifying 
signs but does not exempt noncommercial nonidentifying signs could 
not give a reasonable justification in light of its goals to improve the 
city's appearance. If one type of noncommercial nonidentifying sign is 
exempted while another type of noncommercial nonidentifying sign is 
not, the ordinance is invalid if it suppresses a point of view or contro-
versial subject matter or if there is no reasonable justification for favor-
ing one type of sign. 
The identifying/nonidentifying distinction would substantially re-
duce the dangers of granting discretion to billboard regulators. With 
the protection of identifying signs secured, 'the benefits to aesthetic in-
terests from utilizing the Stevens/Burger test would easily compensate 
257. The facial difference between Stevens' test and Burger's is that Burger disallows a re-
striction based on "topics for public debate" while Stevens disallows a restriction based on "con-
troversial subject matter." This difference is merely facial, as both justices would allow 
"discrimination" according to subject matter when the government has no hidden motive of 
suppressing speech. Hence, both justices would permit an exemption for the "topic" or "subject 
matter' conveyed by "for sale" signs. See supra notes 80, 90 and accompanying text. Indeed, 
"for sale" signs would not be protected under a narrow view of content-neutrality which disal-
lows restrictions based on subject matter. 
258. While this Note argues to the contrary, see supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text, 
one could argue that alternative means might be inadequate for some nonidentifying signs. Even 
so, identifying signs have a special claim to first amendment protection. 
259. See supra notes 81, 91 and accompanying text. 
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for whatever negligible discretionary dangers remain. For instance, 
the Stevens/Burger test would enable a city to exempt temporary (or 
permanent) political campaign signs, an impossible result if identifying 
signs constitute the only permissible exemptions. Freed from an un-
workable notion of "content-neutrality," a city would be able to grant 
reasonable exemptions based on a determination that a given commu-
nicative interest outweighs the city's aesthetic interest,260 but avoid the 
allegation that it acted unconstitutionally because it did not "abridge 
enough speech."261 Within the limits imposed by viewpoint neutrality 
and the identifying/nonidentifying distinction, a city with discretion 
to make aesthetic judgments may approach the problem of billboard 
regulation with the flexibility or "delicacy" the problem requires.262 
As Rehnquist argued: "[L]ittle can be gained in the area of constitu-
tional law, and much lost in the process of democratic decisionmak-
ing, by allowing individual judges in city after city to second-guess ... 
legislative or administrative determinations" to ban signs. 263 This 
Note argues that, in the case of sign prohibitions, the identifying/ 
nonidentifying distinction puts an appropriate limit on "democratic 
decisionmaking" with respect to aesthetic judgments. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Metromedia seven Supreme Court justices agreed that a city 
may regulate aesthetics under its police power and that generally a city 
may ban outdoor signs for aesthetic reasons alone. But four of these 
seven justices restricted such a ban to commercial signs, holding that 
the first amendment affords greater protection for noncommercial 
signs. These four criticized the San Diego ordinance for favoring cer-
tain types of noncommercial signs over others. They reasoned that, 
generally speaking, all noncommercial speech has equal value under 
the first amendment. But given their basic sympathy for local aes-
thetic interests, one suspects that had they been presented with a prin-
cipled means by which to distinguish noncommercial signs that could 
be prohibited from noncommercial signs that could not be, some of 
them might have contributed to a different and more sensible prece-
dent for sign prohibition cases. This Note has presented such a princi-
pled means, arguing that - as aesthetic considerations motivate sign 
bans - it should not matter whether a sign is commercial or noncom-
mercial. Only signs that identify the premises on which they are lo-
cated must be constitutionally protected. Additionally, the Note has 
argued that a government may ban nonidentifying signs at its discre-
tion as long as it does not discriminate against viewpoint or against 
260. 453 U.S. 490, 565 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
261. 453 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
262. See 453 U.S. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
263. 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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controversial subject matter, and as long as the effect of the regulation 
relates reasonably to its objective. 
In defending the distinction between identifying and nonidentify-
ing signs, the Note has demonstrated the inadequacy of protecting all 
noncommercial signs. Affording this protection ignores the fact that 
sign bans target the signs themselves, not their content; more impor-
tantly, it ignores whether or not a given sign can be replaced by an 
alternative means of communication. Identifying signs - whether 
commercial or noncommercial - deserve constitutional protection be-
cause no other medium can assume the sign's function of telling the 
viewer he has arrived at a given place. Nonidentifying signs -
whether commercial or noncommercial - should not be constitution-
ally protected in general because where a sign prohibition does not 
target sign content in order to control public debate, local efforts to 
remove perceived unsightliness should be respected. 
- R. Douglass Bond 
